THE NATION

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Eastern Europe The New Trade Frontier

HAROLD J. BERMAN

VIETNAM: THE REALITY WE SCORN

Bernard Fall and General Giap reviewed by JONATHAN MIRSKY

'What Were They Like?' A POEM BY DENISE LEVERTOV

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LETTERS

a very large 'No'

Aberdeen, Md.

DEAR SIRS: Richard Swerdlin, assistant professor at Southern Illinois University suggests in *The Nation* [letter, May 23] that "it is time to seriously consider lowering the voting age to 18." Speaking on behalf of myself (the 20-year-old whom I know best), I counter Mr. Swerdlin's suggestion with a very large "No."

Two years ago I came out of one Aberdeen high school with one diploma signifying that I had a high school education. A high school education—what is that?

In high school I was taught that "we are right and they are wrong"—"we" being American, and "they" being the Communists. I was taught a hatred for Communists along with the line, "the United States is a peace-loving country." But I was not taught how to think or prepare for the right to vote.

Since June, 1964 (graduation day), I've put in a year (two semesters) at Bowling Green State University, Bowling Green, O., and in the last six months I've been reading, thinking and studying on my own. In this I've tried to get "into the hair" of the editor of the *Baltimore Sun* and I've succeeded, in part, to the tune of four printed letters to the editor (and one or two editorials that read like two letters sent). . . . I don't believe everything I read nor do I believe most of what comes out of Washington (I wait for "official denials"). I may not be ready to vote now (I may never be), but I am more ready today than I was two years ago, one year ago or yesterday.

If I had been given the vote at 18 I would have merely stamped approval on the hatreds I had been taught to accept for twelve years—stamped approval on the lies, half-truths and "official denials" that are choking this society. No, Mr. Swerdlin, the three to four years between high school and the voting age do not provide "opportunity for indifference to set in" but instead, opportunity for self-education and self-preparation to undo twelve years of "we've never lost a war, yet" thinking to be tossed out. *Tom Jones*

bucking the system

New York City

DEAR SIRS: It has become fashionable for certain sociologists to demonstrate their radicalism and their passion for the poor by saddling the social workers with all the responsibility for the evils of the system and publicly beating up on them for their insensitivity, their cowardice, their "welfare colonialism" and other sins. This display would be considerably more impressive if these critics were themselves to produce some sharp and radical analyses of the economic system that creates the conditions they rightfully deplore. But Richard Cloward ["A Strategy to End Poverty," *The Nation*, May 2] has no criticism of capitalism, only of welfare; and he would solve the problems of public assistance by sabotaging the whole program. Further, he would "end poverty" through the guaranteed annual income, which he naively assumes will be pegged at rates far above the bare subsistence levels of public assistance.

What Roy Lubove comes up with ["The Welfare Industry: Social Work and the Life of the Poor," *The Nation*, May 23] is that social workers should transform themselves into "hawks," eschew their "service role" and "confront the hard questions of power and income redistribution." One needs to ask which of the "service roles" he wants deleted and what such a "con-

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EDITORIALS

Dinner at the White House

The problem of campaign costs has reached an impasse (see article by Victor H. Bernstein, p. 770), and it is by no means clear what should be done about it. One thing is clear, however: the shameless exploitation of the office of the Presidency in the Lyndon B. Johnson manner calls for the sharpest public rebuke. Mr. Johnson is reported to be thin-skinned, for a politician, and to be stung by criticism, however well intentioned. If he could manage to displace some of this sensitivity to his fund-raising activities, the problem of financing elections democratically would remain, but at least one gross offense against political decency would be eliminated.

By tradition, the President wears two hats—as Chief Executive and as the leader of his party. Presidents have always participated in politics and in raising money for political campaigns, but as a rule they have been at some pains to keep the two roles separate, or at least to maintain the appearance of separation in their public activities. In this way Lyndon B. Johnson's predecessors avoided flagrant violation of the dignity of the office. The nearest approach to Mr. Johnson's fund-raising techniques was Dwight D. Eisenhower's practice of giving stag dinners at the White House for big donors, but it was left to Mr. Johnson to throw discretion to the winds. By allowing his fund-raising organizations to be called the "President's Club," he is peddling the prestige of the office at $1,000 per head ($2,000 for those contributors who bring their wives to the annual dinner-dances of the "club").

Reportedly, a "super-dooper" President's Club is now being organized, limited to membership at $10,000 apiece, for which the reward will be dinner with the President at the White House. The faithful Bill Moyers has denied that such a Medicean scheme is in prospect, but Doris Fleeson, in whose *New York Post* column the report appeared, points out that Moyers shows no disposition to reveal White House guest lists.

It would be the height of naïveté to imagine that the current $1,000 affairs are patronized exclusively by Democrats. Many of the contributors are undoubtedly Republicans seeking status, or figuring that it may be good business to belong. Since the 1964 President's Club membership was about 3,800, it can hardly be regarded as an elite organization through which influence at the White House may be purchased, but if a businessman is approached, he may feel he had better contribute—it can do him no harm, while to refuse might be imprudent. Even if most of the donations are entirely voluntary, there is always the suspicion that the power of the Presidency has been used by lower-level money raisers in a manner verging on improper pressure.

Nowhere is the affluent society more affluent—and more corrupt—than in its politics. It is impossible to arrive at a reliable estimate of the cost of a national campaign, but $200 million seems to be a minimal figure for 1964. Much of this tidy sum is contributed by corporations, although corporate contributions to candidates for federal office are illegal. The law is easily circumvented. As *Business Week*

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points out, the burden of political giving rests on the business executive personally. He writes a check on his own bank account. He is reimbursed by the company through a bonus or some expense-account legerdemain. His contribution is not tax deductible, but the amount of the company's reimbursement can cover his total expenditure, or a little better.

While engaging in improper practices himself, President Johnson has proposed legislation for new controls on campaign contributions and expenditures. The only effect of the proposed controls on the President's Club would be to require clubs organized as state committees to report their finances to the Clerk of the House of Representatives and the Secretary of the Senate. Corporations could contribute through their executives as they do now, and the President's Club could continue its activities unhindered. While sponsoring reforms, Mr. Johnson might better set a good example himself, and the place to begin is with these so-called clubs of his.

Count the Civilians

We had always assumed that our expeditionary force to Vietnam was there for some purpose other than slaughtering civilians, but after noting Robert Guillain's estimate in *Le Monde* (see "America's Colony in Hell," June 13) that 100,000 Vietnamese civilians were wiped out by U.S. Air Force bombings last year, it is clear that our assumption should be modified. We went to the Pentagon recently to get a comparative estimate from official sources and were told by a Colonel Vickery of the press information office that the Department of Defense does not think in such bloody totals. As a matter of fact, he said, the Pentagon recognizes and acknowledges having killed "less than 200" Vietnamese civilians last year and "we expect the rate will be much less this year."

Vickery's figure represents those claims against the United States Government which the Pentagon admits to be valid. In other words, in dealing with that tiny nation the Department of Defense is its own judge and jury—not to mention executioner. Actually 11,000 claims were made against this government by the Vietnamese last year, although not all of these were for deaths attributable to trigger-happy Americans; some were for injuries, some for property destruction.

The "less than 200" figure makes up in absurdity what it lacks in accuracy. Our generals on the one hand boast of having killed 35,000 "Vietcong" last year; but Colonel Vickery concedes that such is the character of this war that "we don't always know who's a civilian" and who is a VC, and yet the Pentagon insists that only 200 civilians, give or take a few, were knocked off by our side.

The hypocrisy of the Pentagon's figuring has not gone unnoticed. Sen. Claiborne Pell in a committee hearing put the question to General Griffith: "Would they [the Pentagon's estimate] seem to you, as a military man, and bearing in mind the scope of the operation, to be in the realm of accuracy?" General Griffith squirmed at that one, saying, "I would rather not answer that question if you don't mind, Senator. I will answer it to you privately." Secretary of State Rusk also answered sorrowfully that every effort is made to avoid civilian casualties "wherever pos-

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sible," but he just didn't know how unsuccessful these efforts are.

Finally Pell demanded that the Department of Defense tell him if the Vietnamese peasants even know there is such a thing as an indemnification program. And how easy is it for the peasants to enter claims against the U.S. Government? And how do we evaluate their losses? All good questions. But to date Pell has received very unsatisfactory answers—mere "GI gobbledygook," one of his aides summed it.

Whether or not Rep. Clement J. Zablocki's earlier estimates are accurate—that our soldiers are killing six civilians for every Vietcong in some engagements, and two for one in others (by the most conservative figuring, this would come to 70,000 civilians killed last year)—it is safe to say that Zablocki is more accurate than the Pentagon, whose only aim in these calculations appears to be deception. Over one six-week period, the 1st Cavalry reported twenty-four civilians killed and 131 wounded. By the time this was strained through the Pentagon, it came out to be six killed and twenty-one wounded.

Andrew Hamilton of the *Herald Tribune* recently complained, "The Department of Defense can supply statistics on just about every countable aspect of the war—except civilian casualties." It can tell you how many Vietnamese officials were assassinated or kidnaped by the enemy, how many VC were killed, captured, and wounded during any week. But when it comes to looking over the ground and counting the babies and old men and women, the Pentagon's score keeper is blind. Strange indeed. Can it be, as Anne Freemantle asked, that the civilians are not considered worth counting? "At shoots," she reminds us, "the keepers do not count the rabbits. But surely, humans—even if Vietnamese —deserve enumeration."

The Adamant Mr. Meany

It may be that the George Meany-Jay Lovestone combination has overreached itself in its anti-Soviet intransigence. By a margin of one vote a Pole, Leon Chajn, was elected to preside over the scheduled three-week meeting of the International Labor Organization in Geneva. Lovestone, who is as fanatically anti-Communist as only an ex-Communist can be, had counted on the election of a safe free-enterprise candidate, Gerald J. Veldkamp of the Netherlands. Possibly because Veldkamp was known to be the Lovestone candidate, Chajn won. There was no dispute as to the fairness of the election, but immediately Meany (Lovestone) ordered the five-member AFL-CIO delegation to walk out of the conference.

The ILO is one of the specialized agencies of the UN. It includes government, labor and employer representatives of the 114 member nations. The election of Mr. Chajn was a defeat for the U.S. representatives—government and employer as well as labor—since all had supported Mr. Veldkamp, but the walkout was confined to the AFL-CIO contingent. Since the Johnson Administration has been trying to improve relations with Eastern Europe, the boycott was acutely embarrassing to the U.S. Government. UN Ambassador Arthur Goldberg, Secretary of Labor Willard Wirtz, Under Secretary of State George W. Ball all tried to get Meany to reverse his stand but to no avail. President Johnson himself then conferred with Meany who, as anyone in the know could have predicted, remained firm. Age has only intensified the legendary Meany obstinacy, and in foreign affairs he would no more think of overruling Lovestone, who is *de facto* his secretary of state, than President Eisenhower would have thought of reversing a decision of John Foster Dulles.

Not only is the AFL-CIO boycott awkward from the standpoint of the U.S. image abroad and American foreign policy, but the Meany-Lovestone entente is an increasingly divisive force within the AFL-CIO. Walter Reuther, president of the 1.5 million United Automobile Workers, has been trying to improve his relations with Meany—partly, no doubt, to improve his own chances of succeeding to the AFL-CIO presidency. The fracas at Geneva was too much for Reuther, however, and he challenged Meany's stand, calling it "a gross disservice to democracy" for the U.S. union delegates to walk out because the result of a fairly contested election was not to their liking. Meany promptly called a meeting of the AFL-CIO executive council which sustained him by a vote of 18 to 6.

A renewal of the enmity between Reuther and Meany is likely to destroy the former's chances of succeeding Meany. Reuther went into the ring with one hand tied behind his back. Labor politicians were mystified by his strategy, but the answer is simple—the move was not designed to be strategic. Reuther cares enough about the position of the United States in the international labor movement that he cannot abide an attitude so spiteful and, in the long run, so futile.

How long American labor as a whole can stand the Meany-Lovestone rule in foreign affairs remains to be seen. It is not a policy but rather a sterile insistence on cold-war immobility. Under this dispensation, organized labor's influence has steadily diminished. Many labor leaders are aware of this fact and, in private, deplore Meany's obstinacy. The incident at Geneva is only one of many. The AFL-CIO throttled a proposal by the American ambassador to Poland, John A. Gronouski, to send some Polish-speaking trade unionists from his home state of Wisconsin to Poland on a good-will mission. It warned its locals to avoid any contact with a Yugoslav union official who visited the United States last year; the man was, however, informally received by the UAW. The Citizens Exchange Committee invited a delegation of eight Russians from a Soviet labor group to visit this country. Secretary Rusk denied the prospective visitors visas, and made it clear that the AFL-CIO-Meany-Lovestone opposition was the decisive factor.

Sooner or later, however, labor will have to move with the times. One indication is the action, early in May, of 200 trade union leaders, representing thirty-nine international unions, who met in New York to form a trade union

SUMMER SCHEDULE

During July and August, *The Nation* will appear on alternate weeks: issues will be dated July 4, July 11, July 25, August 8 and August 22.

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division of SANE. No high union officials were among them, but many represented not only themselves but the officers and rank and file of their unions. This development, and the stupid walkout in Geneva, may be the beginning of the end for the Meany-Lovestone dominance of labor's foreign policy.

Is Meredith Right?

Nonviolence may be the best policy for the American Negro in the civil rights struggle, but anyone who is sure of it may change his mind after reading the account of the James Meredith march in the June 7 Washington *Evening Star*. The narrator is Sherwood Ross, a reporter for radio station WOL, who accompanied Meredith until the shooting occurred and who was an eyewitness to all that happened before and after. It was Ross who asked Attorney General Katzenbach whether he planned to give Meredith any kind of federal support and received the answer, "Oh, I don't think it's going to amount to much."

On the first day of the march, hundreds of hoodlums cursed and threatened Meredith, crying, "Hurry up, nigger, you're gonna get killed in Mississippi." At one point, in a field bordering the road, mounted white men with ten-gallon hats, waving Confederate flags, reminded Ross of a Jeb Stuart cavalry charge. A special target for abuse was Rev. Robert Weeks, the Episcopalian clergyman from Monroe, N.Y., who was accompanying Meredith. The attitude of the law-enforcement authorities was as disconcerting as the murderous frenzy of the mob. Sheriff Lee Meredith of De Soto County told Ross: "We are going to treat James Meredith just like any other nigger chopping cotton in the fields." They did just that.

Seeing rifles in passing cars and trucks and listening to the threats of motorists and pedestrians hour after hour, Ross asked Meredith: "Do you think this nonviolent approach will work?" Meredith replied: "The time has come when Negroes have got to work for their rights and perhaps even fight for their rights. Nonviolence is not in the American tradition. The American tradition is to get out and work for what you want, to fight for what you want. I'm tired of all this begging and all this pleading. We've got to assert our rights." Then he was shot.

It may be hard to accept, but Meredith is incontestably right. Nonviolence really forms no part of the American tradition. Our tradition is one of violence, and from the earliest time. Witness the savage treatment of the Indians. Witness our numerous wars, at least three of them (counting Vietnam) essentially wars of aggression—or, at the very least, wars that could have been avoided had the impulse toward violence not permeated American society from top to bottom, with few dissenters. Witness chattel slavery, which could be upheld only by violence or the threat of violence, and which played a larger part in the Southern economy than in the economy of any nation since ancient Greece—where it was not based on race. Witness the bloody Civil War we fought over slavery, and the persistence of *de facto* slavery, upheld by violence, to the present day.

On the other side of the coin, we can point to Henry David Thoreau, who paradoxically was one of the apostles of the doctrine of nonviolence which, practiced by Gandhi and others, has spread over the world. But whether it will succeed in the land of its birth remains exceedingly doubtful.

Meredith's statement is a clear summation of what Negroes are up against. Not only do they have to win rights for themselves, with little help from the mass of Americans, but in so doing they will have to change the tradition from one of violence to one of nonviolence. This puts a double burden on them, a burden which is not well understood but which all non-Negroes must view sympathetically. At the very least, we must realize that in the present situation of the American Negro the antithesis of nonviolence, if it should fail, is not violence, but self-defense. Nor does the new policy of SNCC resemble in any essential respect the stand of the Black Muslims, as many disappointed white liberals have hastily concluded. SNCC calls on Negroes to use the political power they have to better their own condition, rather than to rely on integration as a joint white-Negro enterprise in which, as must be perfectly clear by this time, only a minority of whites are willing to join. These are typical of the revaluations that events are forcing on us, and that will be with us for many uneasy tomorrows.

Happy Days Are Here Again

In one of its enlightening roundups, *The Wall Street Journal* confirms that after a brief period of anxiety, expense-account living has made a comeback. In the summer of 1963, the Internal Revenue Service donned a bogy mask and succeeded in frightening many businessmen and the proprietors of the places where they were accustomed to doing much of their business—opulent restaurants, hotel suites, country clubs, duck blinds, yachts and other pleasure domes. The IRS gave warning that detailed records must be kept—showing, for instance, who was present at a three-Martini business lunch and how it was conducive to the cash flow of the corporation which picked up the tab.

Expense-account *bon vivants* asserted that by taking all the hard-earned fun out of business life, the IRS was promoting commercial stagnation. The restaurateurs were even more dismayed, and some began firing bus boys and pricing paper napkins. Nor, at the time, were their forebodings entirely without foundation. The banquet manager at the Mark Hopkins in San Francisco, for instance, reports that right after the crackdown, business parties plunged from $20 dinners to the Spartan level of $7, California champagne became the rule instead of the French product, and orchestras and entertainment were out. The first-class sections of air liners were almost empty except for sad stewardesses.

Now things are back to normal, or better. The director of Park Avenue's Four Seasons restaurant says that as far as he is concerned "normal" would be an understatement. Business spending, in his eloquent phrase, is "a lovely percentage" above the pre-crackdown level. What was then a boom has developed into a superboom.

In some respects, however, the crackdown has made a permanent impress on American business. According to IRS Commissioner Sheldon Cohen, businessmen are keeping better records, thus reducing disputes between them and revenue agents. As the Commissioner says, "After all, there

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is no argument with good records." Keeping good records, whether by talking into a tape recorder after the party or to a secretary when he gets back to the office, has become as much of a habit with the good businessman as making himself irresistible with the right after-shave lotion.

Most revenue agents would not think of challenging a clearly delineated expense account. According to a West Coast accountant sought out by the *Journal* reporter, a typical executive-IRS colloquy goes as follows. *IRS agent:* "I see Mr. Smith claimed club dues at the Burlingame Country Club as a business expense. What does he use this club for?" *Accountant:* "Well, he uses it primarily for entertaining clients." *IRS agent:* "All right." An overzealous agent might ask to see Mr. Smith's account at the club, but for the most part the agents are gentlemen.

Night, What of the Watchman?

Hale County has long been known as the very heartland of the Alabama Black Belt. In Hale, attitudes born in the days of gang slavery have persisted in their starkest and most benighted form. Sheer terror has kept the large Negro majority cowed, listless and silent ever since the false dawn of Reconstruction gave way to the darkness again almost a century ago. With the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, a new glimmer lightened Hale's gloomy horizon. Assisted by federal examiners, Negroes registered in substantial numbers, despite their well-grounded fear of Mr. Charley's reprisals.

In a few months a pitiful handful of Negroes became augmented to an absolute majority of the county's registered voters. Negroes even filed as candidates in the Democratic primary, among them Rev. Henry McCaskill, minister of two rural churches, for the office of sheriff. In Hale, the high sheriff is quite literally The Man. McCaskill's filing for the office was therefore an act of supreme effrontery from the white standpoint. When he actually ran first in a field of four on May 3, the whites knew fear for a change. They rallied behind the white survivor, a state trooper with the Dickensian name of Ben Kizziah, and put pressure on the Uncle Toms to work against McCaskill in the Negro community.

The black candidate's phone began to ring more frequently. The usual anonymous parties reviled him obscenely and threatened him with death unless he withdrew from the sheriff's race. His little girl was told that her daddy had got too uppity and was going to pay with his life. On Sunday morning McCaskill went out to one of his churches in the country to preach. He found only a heap of ashes where his church had stood. McCaskill only campaigned the harder.

McCaskill had run 2 to 1 ahead of Kizziah in the first primary, but in the final run-off on May 31, Kizziah pulled a reversal, outpolling the Negro by the comfortable margin (for Hale) of 900 votes. "A Day of Decency" trumpeted the Greensboro *Watchman's* post-election editorial on June 2. This county seat weekly, edited for at least the past generation by one Hamner Cobbs, has been the stentorian voice of Black Belt proslavery advocates ever since the days of that hated abolitionist, Franklin D. Roosevelt. Back in the thirties, Cobbs led the embattled planters of the Alabama Farm Bureau Federation in veritable Pickett's charges against programs designed to emancipate a token few Negro sharecroppers from bondage to their landlords.

"As for the Negro, McCaskill," commented editor Cobbs in his best strain of patrician condescension, "he ran a good race—a race far better than he was entitled to run, by experience, record, political balance, or mentality." Cobbs quickly ran through his rhetorical gears up to the menacing pitch of "The kindest thing we can say about this man is that he ought to get out of Hale County, and go somewhere else for his evil and dangerous ventures." Cobbs capped this with the not-so-subtle suggestion to Hale County nightriders that they include the McCaskill problem on their agenda of upcoming violence. "He can no longer be a factor in our lives—but, on the other hand, we might very well see that he gets what should be coming to him if he stays here."

We Can Trade With The Communists

HAROLD J. BERMAN
Mr. Berman is a professor at the Harvard Law School. He is the author of many books on Soviet law, including Justice in the USSR *(Harvard University Press).*

Building bridges to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union has been a repeated theme of Presidential utterances since 1961, and in recent years the State Department and the Department of Commerce have spoken often of the need to expand so-called East-West trade. Yet very little has been accomplished thus far, either by government or by private business, to transform these words into deeds. In the field of trade, in particular, our legislation still speaks in terms of countries that are "dominated or controlled by the foreign government or foreign nation controlling the world Communist movement," while business, on the whole, sits back and waits for more positive encouragement from the Executive branch.

Meanwhile, the press discusses more or less academically possible economic benefits that might accrue to the Communist countries, and to us, from a relaxation of our trade restrictions. It is generally considered that our trade with the East could never be very large unless we were willing to subsidize it with long-term credits. Non-Socialist trade with the Eastern European countries and the Soviet Union is now fairly substantial, but it is not considered likely that we could capture a very large share of this market from our Western European competitors. The possibility of breaking into the much larger market which the Communist countries have created among themselves is generally ignored

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—probably because the nature of what might be called "East-East" trade is not understood.

For convenience, we call this "intra-bloc" trade, but it is not a very accurate term. The "bloc" is not a bloc—at least from the standpoint of trade relations. It is clearly not a "Sino-Soviet" bloc, as we used to call it; nor is it a "Soviet" bloc, or an "East European" bloc. If it ever was a bloc, it surely always contained the seeds of its own "de-blocification." There has never been an integrated economic plan or a programed division of labor among the Communist countries; nor do they constitute a customs union, although they do accord one another certain preferences with respect to prices and other matters. It is true that for a period of eight to ten years after World War II, the Soviet Union exerted an enormous pressure on the foreign trade of the Eastern European countries (except Yugoslavia after 1948), but it exerted that pressure individually, bilaterally. The bloc—as a trade combine—has never had more substance than the diminishing political and economic pressure of the Soviet Union upon individual Communist countries has been able to give it.

Similarly, we refer to "East-West" trade, but it is not, in fact, East-West trade. Such a designation is not only a geographical distortion which compels us to speak of a shipment of, say, jute, from Delhi to Warsaw as a shipment from West to East. More important, any analysis of international trade—or of any foreign economic policy—that starts from the premise of ideological regionalism is fallacious. There are, of course, important geographical, political and economic regions in the world; but at least so far as trade is concerned, they are all subdivisions of a larger world economic unity. To approach problems of international trade from the premises of geopolitics was wrong when the Nazis did it in the 1930s and it is wrong today.

This article is another in the series examining the assumptions and perspectives of American foreign policy; others will be appearing in early issues.

Trade between nations is international trade, and all geopolitical arrangements are inevitably subject to conditions imposed by an international economic and legal order which is world-wide in scope and transcends all regional and ideological boundaries. If we impose restrictions on our trade with the Soviets, or with the Bulgarians, it is not because they are Communists but because we consider them to be our enemies, or at least not our friends. We do not impose such restrictions on our trade with Yugoslavia, which is also a Communist country, and we do impose them on trade with Rhodesia, which is not a Communist country.

Similarly, trade relations *among* Communist countries depend to a very large extent on the realities of the international economic and legal order. It is true that more than 70 per cent of their foreign trade has been with one another, and that this has been due largely to their political interdependence and their common political faith. But both history and economics exert a strong pressure to change the situation: the Communist states would *all* like to expand their trade with the non-Communist countries, and in fact that is the direction in which events are moving—despite the enormous strain that has been placed on their relations with Western Europe and the United States by the Vietnamese war. Poland's trade with non-Communist countries now amounts to more than 40 per cent of its total foreign trade; the same is true of Rumania, and for the Czechs and Hungarians the proportion is above 30 per cent. A few months ago Chairman Kosygin stated that the new Soviet Five-Year Plan contemplates that 30 per cent of Soviet foreign trade during that period will be with non-Communist countries.

In the past we have charged the Soviet Union and the Communist "bloc" with pursuing a policy of economic self-sufficiency. Today the charge is returned against us insofar as we have sought to isolate ourselves from trade with the Communist countries. The truth is that economic autarky is unworkable in the modern world. We approached it for a brief period in 1948-52, when the two "camps" faced each other down, and the "East" answered the Marshall Plan by attempting to withdraw into itself. But self-sufficiency, whether national or regional or ideological, is a myth in today's world. Within regions, national traditions and national interests will not be submerged; and between regions there are economic pressures for collaboration that are stronger than the ideological forces of division. This, I believe, is a major lesson of history since the end of World War II, and a major hope for the future.

At the moment, the Communist countries engage in roughly $25 billion of imports and exports annually with one another, as against the roughly $11 billion worth of trade per year that they carry on with non-Communist countries. I stress in passing that neither of these two amounts is paltry, and both have been expanding very rapidly. (It seems to me realistic from a business and a legal point of view to speak of the volume of exports *and* imports, and not just of exports, as we do in our economic statistics.)

The largest trader of the group, is, of course, the Soviet Union, which is now the fifth largest trading country in the world. The Soviets now export more than $7 billion worth of goods annually, and import about the same amount. More than 70 per cent of these $15 billion—some $11 billion—go to and from other Communist countries. Incidentally, some 18 per cent of total Soviet trade has been with Eastern Germany in recent years.

To understand *why* the Communist countries do so much of their trade with one another and to estimate the potentialities for change in this respect, we must first understand *how* they plan and operate their trade.

The first point to be made is that each of these nine countries—I am now referring to the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Eastern Germany, Bulgaria, Albania and Mongolia, but not to Yugoslavia and not to China—is a planned economy; that is, in each of them, all or most of the means of production are owned by the state, all or most of industry is managed by state officials, and most production and distribution of goods is carried out in accordance with a unified, centrally determined, annual program.

From the standpoint of international specialization on the

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basis of cooperative advantage, a planned economy has the serious defect that its internal prices, wages, credit terms and the like are set by its planners. Without a free multilateral monetary and financial market, it is very difficult for the planners of each country to determine whether it is more expensive to produce a given product at home or to import it from abroad; whether it is economically advantageous to export a given product or to consume it domestically. The currency in which such goods are valued is a purely internal currency; it has no legal validity and no precise meaning, for expenditure abroad.

That brings up the second point: that each of the nine countries—with its own inconvertible currency, its own pricing system, its own wage policies, its own production

and distribution plan—deals individually, bilaterally, with each of the other countries in arranging for the mutual exchange of needed goods. The planners in each country determine what they would like to import and what is available for export; then the government of each negotiates with the government of every other, bilaterally, for mutual exchanges. Such bilateral intergovernmental trade agreements, providing for a program of deliveries of particular products at particular times, make it easier to plan and administer the domestic economy. The bilateral treaties become part of the five-year and annual plans.

For example, five months ago Bulgaria signed a five-year trade agreement with the USSR for 1966-70, which coincides with a new Five-Year Plan in both countries. The USSR committed itself to export to Bulgaria in the next five years 50,000 automobiles, 15.7 million tons of crude oil, 6 million tons of oil derivatives, 21 million tons of coal, 2 million tons of rolled steel, plus excavators, cranes, industrial and chemical equipment, timber, cotton and a variety of other goods. Bulgaria agreed to export to the USSR 83,000 electric and motor trucks, 355 seagoing vessels and barges, 150,000 tons of tobacco, 465 million bottles of wine, 200,000 tons of wine in barrels, electric motors, machinery, soda, cigarettes, grapes, vegetables and consumer goods. In addition to signing this trade agreement, the two countries signed a protocol stating what goods would be exchanged in the year 1966. The annual protocol becomes part of the annual foreign trade plan of each country, to be implemented by specific contracts between the various foreign trade organizations of the two countries. In fact, the foreign trade organizations—each of which is charged with responsibility for importing or exporting various types of products—often negotiate many of their contracts at the same time that the annual protocol is signed.

In the West such arrangements are often called barter agreements, but in fact it is not so simple. It doesn't make sense to exchange, say, ten barges for a million tons of oil unless you first determine that they have the same value. The goods have to be priced. Indeed, the whole agreement has to be priced before it can be negotiated. The Soviet-Bulgarian five-year agreement called for exchanges of goods having a value of 7 billion rubles. Where does this figure come from? A Bulgarian barge is not produced with rubles, and its cost in Bulgarian currency has no necessary relationship to the exchange rate of the ruble.

In view of the disparity of price policy among the various Communist countries, and the inconvertibility of all their currencies, it is necessary for them to find a standard of value elsewhere, and they have found it in world market prices. These are the prices at which they sell to non-Communist countries, and they are the only prices that have any objectivity for their trade with one another.

I once asked a high official in the Czech Ministry of Foreign Trade what will happen when the whole world is Communist and there are no longer any world market prices. He replied: "We used to worry about that, but then we decided we could forget about it because it was never going to happen!"

The trouble with world market prices, however, is that they fluctuate from year to year, and within a given year; also that they must be broken down according to considerations that may have no exact equivalent in the Communist world. Will you simply average the fluctuating prices of commodities within a given year? What year will you choose as a base year? How often will you change the base year? Will you make adjustments in world market prices to allow for special factors—high costs of production, competition from the West, political effects?

These questions, and also that of price discrimination by stronger Communist countries against weaker, are too complex to discuss here. I shall only mention that some progress toward joint multilateral action has been reached in this matter of pricing. The Council for Mutual Economic Aid (Comecon), formed in 1949 in response to the Marshall Plan, has had very little success in achieving its stated objectives of "economic integration" and an "international Socialist division of labor." But it *has* provided a forum for discussing and working out some common problems. From its recommendations has come the adoption from time to time of average world market prices for various base periods.

The difficulties of economic integration came to a head for the Communist countries in 1962, when Khrushchev proposed, with the support of Czechoslovakia and Poland, to control investment in the Comecon countries by a

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central planning authority. As Gomulka had put it in 1960. "There is no cooperation whatsoever in the important sector of investment; everyone peels his own turnip—and loses by it." Parallel investment had resulted in "non-economical short production runs. In the DDR one economist declared that in 1957, production runs for making office machinery were 5,000 to 30.000, compared with optimum runs in the range of 30,000 to 60,000; he also noted that in 1958, 39,000 autos would be produced in several different factories, compared with an optimum production [he stated] of 70,000 for any one make."* As early as 1956, Khrushchev had complained of "wasteful duplication of effort." "Hungarians, Poles, Rumanians and also the others have tried to build up everything by themselves. . . . [F]or small countries, this creates very great problems, for which solutions cannot be found within national boundaries." Each of the Communist countries "had sunk vast amounts of investment funds into iron-steel combines, penicillin factories, and so forth."

But the 1962 proposal to change this, reflected in a document adopted by the Comecon called "Basic Principles of the International Socialist Division of Labor," was defeated by Rumania. The basic principles declared that "integrated iron and steel centers should preferably be set up in countries that are fully, or nearly fully, provided with ore and processed fuel, or at least possess one of the two." This was specifically directed at Rumania's steel industry, which depended on imported iron ore and whose plants were far from any sources of metallurgical coke. Rumania said no. It preferred to keep its steel industry, and import the ore—and also steel-making equipment—from the West. Since the Comecon observes the rule of unanimity, Rumania's objections had the effect of a veto.

However, there have been some steps toward Eastern European economic integration outside the structure of Comecon. In some cases, one country has granted credits to another to develop an enterprise, the plant remaining the property of the recipient country and repayment of the loan (with interest) being made in kind from the eventual output. Also there have been some joint ownership ventures—to process coal slack and to develop engineering and consumer goods production. Thirdly, an international organization called Intermetall has been established to plan steel investment and to program current production.

As part of their efforts toward integration, the Communist countries have struggled to establish a multilateral clearing system. In 1957, the State Bank in Moscow was designated as a clearing agency; however, bilateral clearing was the normal method, and transfers to multilateral accounts required the agreement of all parties. In 1963, a new International Bank of Economic Cooperation was established, on which each Comecon member has drawing rights. But severe limits are placed on permitted credits during a calendar year, and no participant can, without the consent of the others, remain in debt to the clearing agency beyond December 31. Thus, even the level of cooperation reached in Western Europe in 1950 under the European Payments Union has not yet been achieved for trade among the Communist countries.

Even this sketchy account of the foreign trade system of the Communist countries will, I hope, make clear some of the difficulties which planned economy—and especially planned economy combined with Communist concepts of foreign policy—poses for international trade. Neither the economic principle of comparative advantage nor the legal principle of nondiscrimination finds a congenial atmosphere here. Of course it is true that in almost all countries, whether East, West, North or South, public controls of foreign trade are strict, and free multilateral trade is more an ideal than a reality. Yet as compared with Western Europe and the United States, the rigidities of the Communist system of foreign trade are especially severe.

Nevertheless, there is another important side to the picture. Each of the Communist countries has made very considerable economic progress—at least in terms of industrial development—in the past twenty years (with the possible exception of Czechoslovakia, which started at a very high level of industrialization). Each has substantially expanded its foreign trade, and that expansion is continuing in all directions. Thus, winds of change are blowing, and a spirit of pragmatism and of internationalism is challenging ideological rigidity and nationalism. As Carl Spaeth has put it, the right questions are being asked, and that means opportunity.

All the Communist countries of Europe are making strenuous efforts to decentralize economic decision making, and to expand the role of profits and of indirect economic controls. The spectrum of institutional change runs from the USSR at one pole to Yugoslavia at the other. And along with the greater internal flexibility they now enjoy, individual state economic enterprises are raising the question of independent access to foreign markets. This is of special importance to American businessmen because it creates more possibilities for establishing continuing relationships with particular customers, and for overcoming the problem of discontinuity of trade. Ultimately, American manufacturer-exporters must be in close contact with distribution and sales networks and with the final users of their products, if trade is to be developed to its full potential. At the same time, American importers must be in close contact with the foreign producers. Chairman Kosygin recently called for better market research by Soviet export agencies; we could help him greatly, if he would let us.

Finally, the legal institutions which form the framework of trade among the Communist countries also provide a basis for developing better trade relationships between Communist and non-Communist countries. Their treaties—with each other—of friendship, collaboration and mutual assistance have a good deal in common with traditional treaties of friendship, commerce and navigation. The General Conditions which they have adopted for foreign-trade contracts signed with one another contain many basic principles of contract law familiar in the West. A C.I.F. contract, or ocean bill of lading, or marine insurance policy, or letter of credit has basically the same meaning in Moscow as in New York or Timbuktu. Some legal problems can indeed create difficulties: sovereign immunity, excuse for non-

* This and following quotations from F. L. Pryor, *The Communist Foreign Trade System* (1963).

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performance due to revocation of export license, and others. Yet there is a common legal framework for resolving those problems. For example, the Czechs have recently adopted a rule imposing liability upon the exporter despite impossibility of performance due to denial or revocation of an export license (absent a contractual provision to the contrary). It is a rule that I have urged, against some opposition in this country, in order to meet the potential abuses of the doctrine of frustration, especially when one is dealing with state trading agencies.

One's viewpoint on trade among Communist countries, as well as between Communist and non-Communist countries, can move in either of two directions: cold war, on the one hand, or the unification of mankind on the other. United States policy, for the most part, has gravitated toward the former extreme; I would without hesitation choose the latter. We cannot afford to view trade as a political weapon for containing communism; and the Communist countries cannot afford to view it as a political weapon for isolating themselves from the "capitalist camp." All regionalisms are a transitional stage in the process of unifying—or, if I may coin a word, "communifying"—the peoples of the world.

The experience of the economic relations of Communist countries with one another has itself exposed the folly of any approach to international trade that is less than global. Despite Lenin, economics simply cannot be swallowed up in politics. Law, a third member of the trinity, guards international trade from that fate and insists on its universal character.

PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC OFFICE

THE HIGH COST OF CAMPAIGNING

VICTOR H. BERNSTEIN
Mr. Bernstein, a free-lance writer, was managing editor of The Nation *from 1952 to 1963.*

The cost of political campaigning imposes on the office seeker a qualification not specified in the Constitution: he must either be rich or have rich friends. Perhaps because he qualified so handsomely on both counts, the late John F. Kennedy showed himself to be more sensitive to this situation than have most of our Presidents, and shortly after taking office he appointed a Commission on Campaign Costs empowered to recommend more democratic ways of gilding the path to public office.

The commission made its report to the White House in April, 1962, where for four years it lay (presumably lightly) on the conscience of Mr. Kennedy's successor. At any rate, at the end of May, 1966 (whether by design or not, probably too late for legislative action this election year), President Johnson laid before Congress a series of proposals which in some respects follow the commission's recommendations, but in others depart from them considerably. His proposals are analyzed in detail elsewhere in this article.

These developments have been stimulated by a steady and staggering rise in the cost of political campaigning. A four-year lease on the White House runs to many millions of dollars. A Senate seat can cost a million or more (a fact which accounts, at least in part, for the current travail of Sen. Thomas E. Dodd). More than $2 million was spent to make John Lindsay mayor of New York; even a House race, if it is in a competitive metropolitan district, may require $50,000 for the nomination campaign, and as much again for election. In 1964, the country's political campaign bills (including all races from dog catcher to President) totaled an estimated $200 million. This year, with the White House lease still unexpired, the bill is likely to be somewhat smaller—say $175 million, with the bulk spent at state levels. Do these formidable sums account for the prevalence of riches among our leading politicians (Rockefeller, Kennedy, Harriman, Romney, Pell, Ottinger, Johnson, et al.), and is this good for democracy? On the other hand, is democracy better served by relatively penurious politicians who owe office to support by the rich? How can a democratic electoral system be divorced from an aristocracy of wealth?

Politically, the rich have always been very much with us. The signers of the Declaration of Independence, and to an even greater extent, the authors of the Constitution, were largely landed gentry or wealthy merchants. Our early Presidents were all patrician—even Andrew Jackson, symbol of the rough frontier. Abraham Lincoln proved nothing except that the exception proves the rule. True, there was a tendency for the post-Civil War new industrialists to run the country from wherever they were making their money, rather than from Washington. But beginning with Teddy Roosevelt, most White House occupants have again been drawn from the upper economic strata of American society.

The influence of affluence has been noticeable in the Congress, too, and especially in the Senate, once known as the "millionaire's club." Donald R. Matthews, in his *U.S. Senators and Their World,* analyzed the personnel of the Senate for the decade 1947-58. Of the 180 individuals studied, the author found only two who were sons of unskilled workers: Wagner, son of a janitor, and O'Daniel, son of a construction worker. A handful revealed lower-class origins: Margaret Chase Smith, daughter of a barber, and Everett Dirksen, son of a house painter, among others. The "typical" Senator, Matthews found, was white, Protestant, native born of upper-middle-class origins, and college educated for a profession (most often law). "If these are taken as 'requirements,' " he added, "probably less than 5 per cent of Americans have any significant chance of becoming a Senator."

The American democrat who tends to sneer at the British caste system may be astonished to learn that proletarians

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—miners, steelworkers, carpenters—are a good deal more common in Parliament than in Congress. One reason is that we have no labor party. But more important, perhaps, in an upwardly mobile society such as ours, an individual tends to identify with strata above him, whereas in a more rigidly stratified society he is likely to look to his own class for political representation.

In this country, running for public office is a private enterprise; except in one or two states, tax money does little more than provide boards of elections, polling booths and ballots or voting machines. Like that other waif of the American political system, the political party itself, methods of financing campaigns evolved quite outside the law, and it was not until certain obvious abuses touched the national conscience that regulative legislation was enacted. The first federal statute was adopted in 1867; it protected federal employees against political assessments. Over the next six decades, further laws were passed, and these were finally codified and revised by the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925. This Act as amended, together with the Hatch Act of 1939-40, provides the principal ground rules for the raising and spending of money to attain federal elective office.

Unhappily, the regulations regulate nothing, as is indicated in the boxed summary below of the laws and the loopholes. In the view of many experts, such as Herbert E. Alexander, director of the Citizens' Research Foundation, they make a bad situation worse by encouraging cynical disregard for law, increasing the costs of campaigning, failing to broaden the base of political financing, and leading to so complicated a flow of funds from giver to receiver as to deprive both of any assurance that the money always follows its intended channel.

All advertising, whether to sell soup or win office, entails risk: one never knows whether the results justify the expenditures. In political advertising, there is built-in waste. The multiplicity of committees typical of a candidate's campaign multiplies administrative costs without necessarily increasing income. TV, which is eating up more and more of campaign funds, is more often than not a hugely wasteful medium. At least a dozen times, on my home TV, I watched Richard Hughes campaigning for office in 1964, and he rather won me over. But my admiration, so expensively won, did him no good at all; he was running for governor of New Jersey, while I live in Connecticut.

For a Congressional candidate in a metropolitan district TV is so wasteful that it is rarely used; there are forty or more districts within listening range of the major New York City broadcasting stations. But even without broadcasting costs, a Congressional campaign comes high. "One district-wide mailing," says Robert Price, the deputy mayor of New York and a veteran campaign manager, "will cost at least $20,000, including printing and postage. Two

The Laws and the Loopholes

A Summary of Federal Regulations Affecting the Financing of Political Campaigns — and Why They Don't Work

The Law: No political committee can receive contributions or make expenditures of more than $3 million in any one year. *The Loopholes:* The limits apply only to committees operating in two or more states, and therefore state and local committees are exempt; it permits the creation of any number of interstate committees, each of which may receive or spend up to $3 million a year.

The Law: Every political committee covered by federal statute must report periodically to the Clerk of the House of Representatives the names of all contributors of $100 or more and the names of all persons to whom at least $10 was distributed, together with the totals of all other expenditures. *The Loopholes:* Nobody checks or audits the reports, and you have to go to Washington to see them. They need be kept on file for only two years.

The Law: A candidate for the Senate may spend up to $25,000 and for the House up to $5,000. Each candidate must file, shortly before and again within a month after each election, a statement itemizing each contribution and expenditure made or received by him, or by any person for him, with his knowledge and consent. *The Loopholes:* Note that the law limits expenditures, not contributions receivable. With regard to expenditures, the key phrase is "with his knowledge and consent." The candidate can state that one of his committees put up 100 highway billboards "without his knowledge and consent," and by common consent he can get away with the disclaimer. Since the candidate is entitled to as many committees as he can gather members for, limits to spending disappear entirely. As for reporting, a candidate merely states that all contributions made to him were turned over to a committee for his election. And the committee need not report at all because it is intrastate.

The Law: No national bank, corporation or labor union may contribute to the election, primary, pre-nomination convention or caucus campaign of any candidate for federal elective office. *The Loopholes:* The banned organizations contribute in the name of individuals, or form "educational" or "nonpartisan" organizations which may legally contribute for "bipartisan" purposes. But how "bipartisan" is a COPE get-out-the-vote drive?

The Law: No government contractor may contribute during the negotiations for, or the life of, the contract. *The Loophole:* The president (or secretary or treasurer) of the firm makes the contribution.

The Law: No individual may contribute more than $5,000 to any one candidate or committee during the calendar year. *The Loophole:* But there is nothing to stop the individual from making unlimited $5,000 gifts to as many candidates and committees as he likes.

Note: *No limitations of any kind are placed on the personal receipts or expenditures of candidates for President and Vice President, nor are they required to make any financial report to anyone.*

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brochures—not too much for a four- or five-month campaign—cost another $20,000. If you are lucky, you minimize paid help by getting volunteers; still, there are office rentals, posters, advertising, stationery, phone bills, etc., to pay. The absolute minimum is $50,000." If primary expenses are included, the total may rise to $75,000 or more. That's a lot of money to pay for a $30,000-a-year job with tenure guaranteed for two years only.

How best to spend the money is a big problem; how to raise it is even bigger. "The average Congressional candidate," said Mr. Price, "can expect to get $1,500 from the National Congressional Campaign Committee, another $1,000 from the county committee, and perhaps an additional $1,000 from other party groups. The rest must be raised through solicitation. If he commands a popular following, he can raise a substantial sum from the small contributions of many people through a broadcast or mail appeal. But usually for the bulk of what he needs he must rely on friends, or friends of friends, or labor or business. The biggest givers are likely to be firms with government contracts, or with hopes of getting one; they are what I call the predators—the guys who, if you win, will want something for their money." Mr. Price is on record as stating that, as manager of Lindsay's $2 million-plus mayoralty campaign, he turned down certain large contributions because he thought there were strings attached.

Most campaign managers, and presumably most candidates, are not likely to be that fussy, and the higher and more influential the office sought, the more likely is the contributors' list to be studded with the names of the wealthy. They give directly to party committees, or they buy a page ad in a party pamphlet for $15,000 (until a few months ago, such ads were tax deductible), or they join the President's Club for $1,000, or they pay $100 or more for a "campaign" or "testimonial" dinner (at this writing, Senator Dodd is most anxious to establish before the Senate ethics committee that there is a difference between the two, even if the beneficiary is an incumbent). And not a few are suffused with nonpartisan generosity; in 1964, according to the Citizens' Research Foundation's extensive files, at least eighty individuals gave $500 or more to candidates or committees of both parties.

The real question in all this is not who gives, or how much, but what the giver gets in return. It would be a calumny on our legislators, I trust, and certainly an oversimplification of our politico-economic system, to say that we are governed not so much by the men in office as by the men whose financial support put them there. On any issue, the legislator has many factors to think about other than the interests of his big contributors: his party platform, the wishes of the Administration (particularly if it is of his party), the recommendation of the relevant legislative committee, a voting deal he may have made with a fellow legislator, the rival claims of lobbyists, what he thinks the ordinary people of his constitutency want (in the last analysis, their votes put him into office). There may even be times when he votes his best judgment on what's good for the country.

But history reveals many instances of outright legislative corruption and even more of what appears to be legislative

"Brother, Can You Spare a Million Dimes?"

subservience to an industry. There are in Congress today legislators known as "oil men," or "cotton men," or "air industry men," et al. When, as frequently happens, the welfare of a constituency is bound up with the welfare of an industry, the legislator is torn by no divided loyalty. The worst that may be said of him is that he may be betraying consumers elsewhere who can't vote for him—an occupational hazard in our political system, based as it is on sectional representation.

Furthermore, one may ask: Did big money shape the politics of these "industry" men, or was it their politics that attracted the big money in the first place? In 1956, with Eisenhower the candidate, the top men of the American Petroleum Institute made contributions of $500 or more, totaling $171,750—all of it to the GOP. In 1964, with an old Texas hand running on the Democratic ticket, GOP receipts from this source dropped to $48,000, while the Democrats received $24,000. Considering Johnson's regional and economic background, is there any reason to suppose that he would be a less staunch supporter of the oil-depletion allowance if he hadn't received the contribution of $24,000?

None of this means that the big political contributor gets nothing for his money. Is it coincidence that eleven of the nation's top twenty-five defense contractors paid $15,000 each for a page ad in a book put out by the Democrats last year? Is it coincidence that in 1952, of twenty-seven non-career diplomatic appointments made by Truman, half the beneficiaries had contributed $500 or more to the Democratic Party, and all were Democrats; and that a year later, of thirty similar appointments made by Eisenhower, twelve of the appointees had given $500 or more to the GOP, and all but one were Republican? At the very least, the big contributor gets what Alexander Heard, chancellor of Vanderbilt University, calls "access" to the decision makers.

There is a final consideration: Does money win? From 1932 to 1942, the Democrats, consistently spending less money, won the Presidency. They have done so again since 1960. The 1960 figures will surprise many. Repeated accusations have been made that the Kennedy family "bought" this election; nevertheless, Citizens' Research Foundation statistics show total reported campaign expenditures at the national level as: Republicans, $11,300,000; Democrats,

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$10,587,000. In 1964, the GOP outspent the Democrats by one of the biggest margins in history—and certainly lost by the biggest margin.

However, this seeming triumph of ideology over crass money ignores several factors. For one thing, the incumbent usually does not have to spend as much money as the challenger; his "image" has already been projected. Secondly, the figures given do not include pre-nomination (primary or convention) costs, which federal law does not require to be reported. "It is in seeking the nomination," says Robert Price, "that wealth, or access to it, counts most for the candidate. Once he wins the nomination, he already has the attraction of a winner, and he has the party apparatus at his disposal; until then, he is more or less on his own." In this context, it was in Kennedy's primary victory over Humphrey in West Virginia, say, that money talked loudest.

The conditions under which political campaigns are financed in this country are indictable on a number of major counts: they (1) breed contempt for law, (2) put a premium on wealth, (3) open the office holder to charges of subservience to his financial backers and (4) fail to encourage widespread citizen participation in the pre-balloting electoral process.

Conditions in the West European democracies are somewhat better, I think. This is not because they have better laws, or their people are more law abiding, but because of the nature of their party structures. All major Left parties are tied to labor; whether you are a Labour candidate in Britain, a Socialist in France, a Social Democrat in Germany or a Communist in Italy, everyone knows that your campaign is being financed by union treasuries. While the Center and Right parties are less well organized, and their fund sources not always so precisely definable, they are equally plainly the creatures of business and industry (and, in some instances, the Church). In Germany and France, various trade and industry organizations have set up central collecting agencies for political funds. In some countries (the Conservative Party in Norway, for example), fixed annual quotas are collected from each business firm or trade association. In any case, membership in a European party, whether of the Right or Left, involves not merely an act of penmanship but some form of financial responsibility.

I do not want to oversimplify the European party system; it has its own complexities. But broadly speaking, party labels on the Continent, at least, mean more than they do here, as regards both politics and the financing thereof.

As long as running for public office in the United States remains a more or less private enterprise, it is difficult to see how its financing can be effectively controlled. Teddy Roosevelt saw this in 1907, and as President suggested that election campaigns be subsidized out of the federal treasury. Nobody liked the idea; no doubt it smelled of socialism. In Europe—and elsewhere abroad—the Socialist devil is thoroughly familiar, and no stigma attaches to borrowing from him occasionally. Thus, partial subsidies of the electoral process are quite common there. Where broadcasting is state owned, parties are given a certain amount of free time, usually in proportion to their voting strength. The French Government prints and distributes campaign circulars and sample ballots in behalf of all candidates, and also pays for election posters; Britain underwrites one free mailing for each candidate. Japan publishes an "electoral gazette" containing objective descriptions of all candidates and their platforms, and underwrites two 4x5-inch newspaper ads for each office seeker. Some West German states (*Laende*) award small but direct cash subsidies to the state party organizations; in some instances, the law requires that the money must be used for "educational purposes" (it al-

Distribution of Membership of President's Club, by State, 1964

(Reprinted from "Financing the 1964 Election," by Herbert E. Alexander; published by Citizens' Research Foundation)

This appendix shows approximate distribution of membership, by state, combining state President's Club memberships where separate, and contributions of $1,000 or more by state residents to national-level, non-Congressional Democratic committees. Some duplication may have resulted if an individual contributed to both a state club and to committees at the national level.

State	Number of Contributors of $1,000 or over*	State	Number of Contributors of $1,000 or over*
Alabama	93	Nevada	7
Alaska	2	New Hampshire	9
Arizona	22	New Mexico	3
Arkansas	8	New York**	1,031
California**	532	North Carolina	19
Colorado	34	North Dakota	—
Connecticut	23	Ohio	120
Delaware	18	Oklahoma	18
Florida	135	Oregon	7
Georgia	23	Pennsylvania	65
Hawaii	—	Rhode Island	4
Idaho	4	South Carolina	20
Illinois	173	South Dakota	—
Indiana	5	Tennessee	20
Iowa	2	Texas	400
Kansas	8	Utah	1
Kentucky	11	Vermont	1
Louisiana	26	Virginia	98
Maine	—	Washington	40
Maryland	77	West Virginia	6
Massachusetts	57	Wisconsin	20
Michigan	28	Wyoming	—
Minnesota**	190	District of Columbia	294
Mississippi	21	Puerto Rico	9
Missouri	41	Virgin Islands	4
Montana	7	Canal Zone	—
Nebraska	9	Guam	3
New Jersey	49	TOTAL	3,801

*Husbands and wives counted separately where $2,000 or more was donated.

**Figures combined for state President's Club memberships and contributions of $1,000 or more by state residents to national-level Democratic committees campaigning for President Johnson. Not included are contributions to Senatorial or Congressional or other non-Presidential committees.

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most never is); in other cases, no strings at all are attached.

It remained for Puerto Rico, however, to go almost the whole hog. Under its Election Fund Act of 1957, initiated by Luis Muñoz Marín to rid the country of vote buying and kickbacks from government employees, the national treasury allots each party $75,000 annually in non-election years and (under a 1964 revision of the law) a minimum of $162,500 in election years. The latter sum may be increased, depending upon the number of "straight-ticket" votes the party receives in an election; it cannot, however, be decreased. The allotments are expected to cover the major share of campaign expenses. The law requires a strict accounting of all receipts and expenditures.

In this country, proposals to reform our systems of political financing fall into two schools. Both seek to broaden the base of citizen involvement, to restore public confidence in and increase public respect for the relevant legal regulations, and to increase the opportunities of the poor man to attain office. The difference is that while one school hopes these objectives can be reached in the framework of our "private enterprise" system of fund raising, the more radical school insists that in this field private enterprise simply won't work, and turns to the direct subsidy as a solution.

Typical of the "conservative" school are President Johnson's recent proposals which, like the recommendations of the Kennedy-appointed Commission on Campaign Costs, seek not to change or broaden present political financing methods in any basic way, but simply to control them more effectively. The commission was somewhat more daring than the President, as can be seen by reference to the boxed analysis of the Johnson proposals. Moreover the commission, aware that its recommendations might not prove adequate, suggested that after a trial period they should be subject to revision, with special attention given to a "matching-incentive" system under which private contributions up to perhaps $10 each would be matched by equal contributions from the national treasury.

Plainly, the commission's report was a compromise; its chairman, Professor Heard, has taken a bolder approach elsewhere. While he subscribes to many of the commission proposals, he also urges (1) consideration of payment of cash subsidies to parties and candidates at both state and national levels; (2) government action to reduce TV and radio costs so as to make broadcast opportunities more available for all; and (3) an underwriting by government of some, at least, of the general communications costs of political campaigns.

A year before the Puerto Rican bill was passed, the late

The President's Proposals

An Analysis of His Suggestions for a Federal Election Reform Act

Proposal: All gifts exceeding $100 received by federal legislators, and all income from personal services received by them or on their behalf, are to be reported annually, with appropriate criminal sanctions to be provided for failure to comply. *Critique:* A highly desirable piece of legislation timed, no doubt, to relieve the Democratic Party of some of the pressures upon it generated by the charges against Sen. Thomas E. Dodd (D., Conn.).

Proposal: Every candidate for federal office, as well as every committee—state as well as interstate or national —that supports a candidate would be required to report all contributions and expense items that exceed $100. For the first time, the disclosure provisions would include candidates for the Presidency and Vice Presidency, and also all fund raising and spending in pre-election campaigns (primaries and convention nominations). *Critique:* While plugging many loopholes in present law, the proposal is weakened by two factors. First, its lack of definition of a "committee" would require, presumably, that a handful of high school youngsters who collected $100.29 for a favored candidate would have to report. Under such conditions, disclosures could prove so massive as to be indigestible. The proposal's second weakness aggravates this difficulty: it fails to set up adequate machinery for receiving and processing the reports.

Proposal: Present ceilings on total expenditures by candidates for federal office would be repealed and the total contribution coming from any single source to the campaign of any candidate would be limited to $5,000. *Critique:* All experts would agree on the repeal of present ceilings. Since they are unenforceable, they simply encourage cynical disregard of law. The $5,000 suggested limitation, if adequately enforced, would go a long way toward plugging the scandalous leaks in present law. However, it could not prevent the determined Democrat (or Republican) giver from contributing $5,000 each to as many candidates as he wished.

Proposal: The present law preventing corporations with government contracts from making contributions to federal campaigns should be extended to cover state and local campaigns. *Critique:* A sound broadening of present law, but it leaves untouched a major loophole in the field: corporations, banks and labor unions, all of which are ostensibly barred by present law from political contributions, can still contribute through their individual officers.

Proposal: Individual contributors could deduct from taxable income each year the first $100 of their contributions. *Critique:* As a possible alternative to an income-deduction plan, the Kennedy Commission on Campaign Costs recommended a flat tax credit of half the contribution up to a maximum of $10 a year. As between the two schemes, the flat tax credit is clearly preferable. Under the income-deduction system, the wealthy are favored; i.e., to a person in the 25 per cent income-tax bracket, a $100 contribution would cost $75, while to a richer man in the 75 per cent bracket, it would cost only $25.

Proposal: The only item permitted for sale by a candidate or committee would be campaign souvenirs at no more than $5 each. *Critique:* In 1964, the Democrats charged $15,000 for 1-page ads in their convention publication; if the President's proposal is enacted into law, the Republicans won't be able to follow suit.

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Sen. Richard Neuberger (D., Ore.) offered a measure authorizing direct payments from the federal treasury to the national party committees. In a Presidential year, the amount would be 20c per vote based on the average number of votes cast for President in the preceding two elections; in off years, it would be 15c based on the two preceding votes for Congress. In terms of recent elections, this would mean a subsidy of $10 million to $12 million for each party in a Presidential campaign, and $6 million to $7 million each for an off-year campaign.

Aside from affirming the logical principle that running for public office is properly a public enterprise, and therefore should be publicly financed, the subsidy system offers certain specific advantages. It involves every taxpayer in every election, at least financially; it makes the legislator more (or entirely) independent of private interests, and it increases the political opportunity of men without access to wealth. The tendency toward an undue proliferation of small parties which a subsidy system might encourage could be guarded against by adopting the British practice that requires candidates to post deposits which are refundable only if the candidate garners a stipulated number of votes.

Formidable arguments can be raised against the system. Authority goes where money goes, and allotting the subsidies to the national committees makes the state and local organization subservient to Washington. Local Democratic leaders are already restive over the phenomenal success of the President's Club as a money raiser; they see in it not only a drain of money that ought to remain at home, but also an expansion of Presidential authority over the party. Even if the law mandated the sharing of funds with state and local party organizations, on what basis would the eligibility of these organizations be decided? The New York City Democratic organization is torn by a reform movement; would the reform group be entitled to subsidy funds?

Opponents of subsidies raise two further arguments. Will candidates for nomination be subsidized as well as candidates for election? If so, how do you keep out the crackpots who represent no one but themselves? The British system of demanding deposits might work in states where there are primaries; how could it be adapted to the convention or caucus type of nominating procedure? Finally, the opponents say that subsidies would discourage, rather than encourage, citizen involvement in the electoral process; impersonal tax money should not be allowed to replace the individual, voluntary contribution which gives the voter the feeling that he has a personal stake in the campaign.

Perhaps the most singular aspect of the political finance problem is how few people want to do something about a situation that so many admit to be scandalous (many of the charges against Senator Dodd could be leveled, with equal plausibility, against other legislators). Many politicians agree that the present system is bad; still, the experts' consensus is that even President Johnson's modest reforms will meet with stout Congressional opposition. Legislators who have managed to win office under existing conditions see little reason to make things better for potential rivals. Nor is there any sign that the American voter is pressing hard for change. Most Americans view politics with considerable skepticism anyway; they expect shenanigans, and whether these occur before or after a man reaches office seems of no great moment.

One can argue plausibly that in a country where money, education and broad social outlook tend to be strongly correlated, it is a good thing that wealth should play an important role in politics. In a better ordered society, of course, no such correlation would exist, and there would be no justification for the advantage that wealth now gives the politician. While we wait for the millennium, some form of subsidy would seem to be in order, if only for the reason that the one-third or one-quarter of Americans who are ill fed, ill housed and ill clothed are also ill represented—or not represented at all—in government. And perhaps, as a start, the funds needed for subsidies could be raised by a turnover tax on the broadcasting, advertising, printing and newspaper industries. They are the industries the money would be spent on in any case.

OUR DISTURBED CHILDREN

WHO IS TO CARE FOR THEM?

WILLIAM RYAN

Dr. Ryan, a psychologist, teaches in the Harvard Medical School Laboratory of Community Psychiatry, and is a mental health consultant for the Massachusetts Committee on Children and Youth.

Establishment of the new Joint Commission on the Mental Health of Children has quickened the hopes of many that as America breaks into a slow trot on the long road to the Great Society, it will finally turn its eyes toward the suffering millions of its children. The new commission represents the unified efforts of many professional organizations and voluntary agencies. It came into being as a result of federal legislation, is financed mostly by federal funds and, like most Great Society programs and their by-products, contains within it both the potential for vigorous advocacy and action and the temptation to pointless posturing and the sterile repetition of discredited wisdom.

The real task confronting the commission goes far beyond the execution of a grand research project. Like the farmer who passed up agricultural extension courses because he wasn't yet farming half as well as he knew how, we have already more knowledge than we are using. There remain great areas of ignorance, and what we do know needs to be expanded and refined; but one of the major problems is that the field of mental health now possesses much

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knowledge that it cannot deal with, knowledge that creates dilemmas and the need for difficult decisions.

If this new enterprise on behalf of emotionally disturbed children is to be effective, it will have to confront these dilemmas. The temptation will be to skirt them, to urge that we continue what we're doing but in double or triple dosages. The challenge, which the commission must not duck, will be to risk controversy and recommend change. If it is to meet that challenge, it must receive the public's understanding and support. It must also be influenced by citizens who recognize that professionals have not only special competence but also special interests.

Who takes care of emotionally disturbed children? Who cares about them? To attempt to answer these relevant questions it is necessary to know something about present patterns of care. It is equally necessary to know some of the reasons why all those who are concerned about disturbed children cannot translate their concern into effective action. To this end, the following paragraphs will summarize a few of the pertinent facts, describe some of the resulting problems, and suggest some possible solutions.

How many emotionally disturbed children are there? Who helps them and how? How did they get that way? Which children get help, which go without?

At least 5 million children are estimated to be emotionally disturbed to a handicapping degree. Most are only moderately disturbed. They may function poorly in many ways, be miserable, disruptive or unmanageable; but they can bear their burden of anxiety and deviance well enough to remain at home and go to school. Perhaps a half million are severely disturbed; many are so out of touch with the world that they must be defined with horror as already psychotic.

One of the hardest facts to face is that only a tiny minority of the 5 million get any help from our present opulent array of psychiatric resources. In the course of a year, considerably fewer than 1 million of these children have even passing contact with a psychiatric agency or mental health professional and, of these, only about one-third are considered to have been, in any sense, treated. And some who are counted as helped may more properly be thought of as harmed. Eighteen thousand children are today shuffling or racing through the wards and corridors of public mental hospitals; many are not even separated from the adult psychotics, and only a fraction receive help that goes much beyond food and a roof. We are still putting children in snake pits.

The other side of this picture is that many disturbed children untouched by the mental health network are in the care of other social institutions. Much of this care is only nominal—more truthfully described as neglect—but much of it is conscientious and some of it is very helpful. Physicians, family case workers, settlement workers, policemen and probation officers, clergymen, teachers and guidance counselors, these and many other adults in the child's world are confronted daily with the puzzling problems of disturbed children. Most such children get no more treatment than what these men and women can provide.

It has been estimated that, among the 3.5 million children who are either beneficiaries of the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program or receiving public child welfare services, more than half a million, perhaps a million, are disturbed. The only help for most of them comes in the form of infrequent attention from a social worker, usually a young woman who lacks much formal training, is inadequately supervised and poorly paid. Although a surprisingly large number of these women are sensitive, practical and devoted to the children in their charge, they are so grossly overloaded that with the best will they can do little. And meager public assistance grants, cruelly and grudgingly given, doubtless produce such demoralizing effects for many that the AFDC program itself can logically be considered a severe mental health hazard. In other settings—and this is most often true for children being seen in private case work agencies—children are treated with at least as great skill as they would be in a psychiatric clinic.

The fate of most falls between these two extremes. For example, some disturbed children who are in foster homes are merely fed and taken care of, with decency but without much understanding; others have unusual foster parents, supported by skilled case workers, and they are loved and cherished and substantially healed; still others are damaged through being shifted about from the tense battlefield of one home to the rejecting wasteland of another. There are children, battered and distressed by a life of poverty and rejection, who have been rescued and made whole by a worker in a settlement house. Others have been in the same building for a day or for many days, and have departed still empty and hurting.

Severely disturbed, even psychotic children are to be found in institutions for delinquents, in schools for the retarded, in group homes for neglected children, even, unbelievably, in county jails. Some of these places are modern, warm and helpful. Too many are overcrowded and understaffed, and every state has at least one barren building that fits the description of a terrifying orphanage from the pages of Dickens.

Why children become disturbed is still obscure, and this is particularly so of the estimated half million who are severely disordered. The causes are probably a mixture of genetic, organic, psychological and social factors. That is why treatment involving great skill, much money, and often a special setting away from home, frequently produces results that are disappointing. We use a theoretical structure that focuses largely on internal factors, and reflects the basic perception of relationships between child and parent. Decades of research have produced only sparse factual material to support this structure. On the other hand, a wealth of data shows that poverty and emotional disturbance run close together. There is persuasive evidence that crowded slum housing, racial discrimination, unemployment and other concomitants of poverty have a direct and devastating effect on the emotional well-being of its victims. However, this vital knowledge has penetrated little into the domain of current practice [see "What Poverty Does to the Mind" by Robert Coles, *The Nation,* June 20].

One ironic example of this gap between knowledge and practice is the fact that poor children, who are most likely to be disturbed, are least likely to be helped. Though they frequently find their way to such facilities as child guidance clinics, they are less likely to be among the one-out-of-three

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applicants who actually enter treatment. It is even more ironic that the nature of their disturbance is transformed into the reason for their rejection. In the eyes of many mental health professionals, the poor appear to be "unmotivated," "nonverbal," "resistive," "hostile" and generally unappetizing.

Another large group of children who tend to go unhelped are the most severely disturbed. They are less likely to be accepted for treatment in outpatient facilities. And for those whose effective treatment requires a setting outside their own home on a full-time or part-time basis, there are no more than 175 residential and day-care centers, with a total capacity of less than 6,000, that can be considered at all adequate for their specialized care. These facilities have many, many applicants for each available space.

In many parts of the country, there are no appropriate service agencies that can be approached even unsuccessfully. While counties that have little or no human services tend to be rural and sparsely populated, the fact remains that for hundreds of thousands of children their community provides no formal helping resources whatsoever.

Knowing all this, it would not be unreasonable to conclude that very few persons indeed really care about emotionally disturbed children, but that would not be true. What is true is that different people care in different ways, that their caring often narrows their vision, and that caring so much often leads them to propose simple solutions to a problem that is uncommonly complex. Different groups within the mental health field work at cross-purposes, but latent conflicts are repressed. Urgent issues that must be discussed and decided are buried under generalized agreement about vague and ambiguous principles. The primary task of the new Joint Commission is to expose and deal with some of these issues, to wit:

Treatment and prevention. Almost the entire output of the mental health professions is devoted to treatment; essentially no heed is given to prevention. Such preventive activity as does go on is furnished by social welfare, citizen and public health interests, is largely limited to advice about raising children and lowering tensions, and has continued over the years with no evaluation as to its usefulness.

Should we continue this pattern, spending most of our limited funds on efforts to salvage the deeply damaged children who constitute our early psychiatric casualties? Or is it more sensible to try to prevent these casualties, which now occur in such huge numbers that we cannot begin to deal effectively with them? While almost everyone would agree that a preventive strategy is, in the long run, more humane, in practice no one is willing to withdraw funds from treatment, to turn away even more mentally ill children to suffer out their time as best they can. The demand for treatment is so great that new funds inevitably get sucked into the vacuum. Compounding this dilemma is the



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fact that treatment is too often unavailing and, in most cases, only somewhat helpful; while our knowledge of preventive techniques—beyond simple education and advice—is scanty, largely theoretical and, for the most part, untried in practice.

In one sense, as will be shown in more detail later, the dilemma grows out of simple stinginess—dollars are so few and time so short that the emphasis on treatment is inevitable. Another point is that no one is in a position to make the fateful decision that a substantial portion of resources should be spent on prevention. Funding sources are diverse and uncoordinated and follow no overall guiding principles. Professional leadership is almost exclusively



vested in the psychiatrist, whose interests and training combine to focus his attention on healing the suffering child whom he sees in front of him. Social science and public health interests, which might influence the development of preventive strategies, are relatively powerless when weighed against clinical interests that push for treatment.

There is, in short, no overall nationally agreed on policy about the need for investing in preventive as well as treatment programs. To hammer out such a policy should be a major item on the agenda of the Commission on the Mental Health of Children.

Psychiatric vs. nonpsychiatric programs. There is an old joke that illustrates a central mental health paradox. A drunk is observed on his hands and knees under a lamppost, searching, he says, for a half dollar that he dropped. When asked where he dropped it, he points to the bushes beside the road. His answer to the next inevitable question is that there's more light under the lamppost.

So it is in mental health, where virtually all trained professionals work under the lamppost in psychiatric agencies —and see only a tiny fraction of the disturbed population. Hardly any of them explore the bushes of the non-psychiatric agencies, where most of the disturbed are to be found. Under these circumstances, does it make sense to put the majority of our resources into psychiatric programs, which have a near monopoly of staff; or into non-psychiatric programs, which have a near monopoly of disturbed children?

A strong case can be made for each alternative, in the one case on the ground of building up the supply of definitive treatment resources; in the other, of dealing quickly with as broad a group as possible of the children affected. But several other considerations suggest that investing more generously in *non*-psychiatric programs is the better choice. For one thing, the manpower shortage in the mental health professions is not only acute but shows little sign of drastic improvement. And even doubling or tripling the number of people engaged in psychiatric services would probably do little to relieve the pressure. For example, the cities of Boston, New York and Washington have relatively abundant supplies of manpower, proportionately two or three times that of Chicago, Detroit and St. Louis. Nevertheless, the sense of being besieged and in need of vast reinforcement is at least as strong in the former cities as in the latter. For another thing, the problems and the needs of disturbed children fall into patterns that do not all fit neatly into the treatment programs of the clinics and the child psychiatrists. Nurseries, community centers and schools may be more advantageous settings; and group work, educational and other kinds of approaches more suitable methods for dealing with such children.

Whatever the decision, the alternatives should be confronted and a policy promulgated. Again it is a task for the new Joint Commission.

Psychic and social targets. The majority of children who are only moderately disturbed show their disorder in behavioral, rather than in purely emotional, terms. This is particularly true of children whose disturbance seems to be related to their environments. For these, traditional psychiatric methods—in the rather rare instances when they are applied—seem notably unsuccessful. For one thing, such treatment is usually given without any effort being made to change the noxious social conditions; for another, there is serious doubt that the internal psychic mechanisms of these children are as extensively out of kilter as they appear to be; the behavior disorders may, in fact, be a somewhat adaptive reaction to intolerable situations.

What has not been tried on any large scale is straightforward correction of the environmental conditions that produce stress and deprivation. But granted that concern about slums, segregated schools and unemployed fathers hanging on street corners fits into a mental health context, how is it to be converted into action? Psychiatric professionals are trained to treat emotional disturbance, not social conditions. Many in mental health respond by trying to extend the boundaries of the field to include virtually all of life; some are busily reinventing the whole field of social welfare in the guise of new mental health programs. This approach may be naive.

It is probably wiser to recognize the primacy of other programs—social welfare, anti-poverty and public health—and to limit the roles of mental health professionals to collaborative and consultative activities. The task of the Joint Commission is to try to define their role in eliminating mentally unhealthy social conditions.

Mental Health and Illness. Recent investigation has been exploring the idea that mental health and mental illness are

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not opposite ends of the same continuum, but two separate, though perhaps overlapping, dimensions. Mental health is reflected in drives toward self-realization, mastery of the environment, and coping with one's own destiny; mental illness is evident in such concepts as defect, handicap, symptoms and disability. Such a formulation allows for varying degrees of mental health and illness within the same individual, the balance between them being of greater significance than the absolute quantities of each.

There is empirical evidence to fit this hypothesis. Most patients in private psychiatric treatment, for example, function very well despite their disorder. They may experience great anxiety, depression or other symptoms that imply a great deal of pathology, but nevertheless they hold demanding jobs and maintain extensive family and social responsibilities.

Another corroborative phenomenon has been noted during times of civil rights demonstrations, particularly in Southern cities. When members of the Negro community are vigorously engaged in protest activity—in other words, when they are engaged in "mentally healthy" activity aimed at mastering their own fate—the incidence of crime, family disputes and other behavioral pathology decreases dramatically.

To apply this principle to mental health programs means that treating pathology would become only half the mental health job. The balance would consist of creating and influencing situations to provide occasions and supports for the disturbed—and those most likely to become disturbed—to cope with their own environment, to play an active role in influencing the conditions that affect their own lives. One could even conceive of such a radical proposal as mental health programs that encouraged the "maximum feasible participation" of the emotionally disturbed.

For children this would mean not only generating more psychotherapy but also working for conditions in the classroom, the family and the neighborhood that foster responsible, self-directing freedom. From the point of view of public policy, it would seem that the classroom is the most appropriate target for such an approach, since it is there that the state already undertakes to influence and mold the child. A mental health impact on education would have to focus on the slum school, with its irrelevant curriculum, the condescending attitudes of its teachers, and its dull and rigid atmosphere. At the same time, something must be done about the smothering, brainwashing, grade-drenched atmosphere of the "good" suburban schools, one of whose products is the invisible insanity of the cool and agreeable mathematics Ph.D. who is planning out his "academic" career in operations research for the Pentagon, calculating the parameter of megatons and megadeaths in a paranoid fantasy of mass destruction. The new Joint Commission must speak about the conditions that encourage mental health as well as the means of patching together the casualties of mental illness.

Spending priorities. About $1.5 billion of tax money is spent on direct psychiatric care of individuals. Most of this goes to public mental hospitals, the final solution for the end products of all the damaging forces in our society; only 10 to 20 per cent of this money is spent on care for children. We're willing to spend much more to kill 1,000 Vietcong soldiers. In the sense of putting our money where our mouth is, we care very little about disturbed children.

Of course, even if we tripled or quadrupled expenditures (that would still be far less than 1 per cent of public spending) we could still not solve all problems; but we might at least confront some of the issues and choices, freed of the cramping concern to save money at the expense of children's distress. Given enough money, we might not always have to choose despairingly between treatment and prevention, between social and psychological approaches.

But if we had the money, how would we spend it? This, again, is one of the crucial questions facing the Joint Commission. In terms of the issues presented above, one set of principles can be advocated as a basis for making decisions:

¶ Up to one-half the total expenditures for childhood mental health should be spent on research, program development and demonstrations, leading to continuing operational services in the area of prevention.

¶ Money for mental health should be spent in relatively greater amounts in non-psychiatric areas than in psychiatric service programs.

¶ Emotional or behavioral problems that can be identified as growing out of social conditions should be dealt with primarily by altering the conditions, rather than by tinkering with the psyche of the victims.

¶ The achievement of mental health, in the sense of learning responsible mastery of the environment and effective participation in the decisions that affect one's life, should be a major goal of mental health programs.

¶ Expenditures for childhood mental health, direct and in-

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direct, should be tripled or quadrupled, with the greatest share of the increase coming from the federal government.

A few examples can be given of possible programs that would fit one or more of these criteria:

¶ Larger amounts of federal money could be appropriated to train and hire teachers of the disturbed, for mental health consultants in the schools, and for research into administrative and classroom factors that promote or impede mentally healthy development.

¶ Through child welfare agencies, the Office of Economic Opportunity could provide large-scale programs for disturbed children who are labeled as neglected or dependent, using nonprofessionals as homemakers, day-care workers, and well-paid and well-supervised foster parents or subsidized adoptive parents. This combines the thrifty use of scarce professionals as trainers and supervisors with the more generous use of money, which is easier come by.

¶ Preventive activity could be started immediately to deal with certain known high-risk groups, through rapid expansion of accessible (psychologically as well as geographically) prenatal and postnatal care; through supportive counseling programs in well-baby clinics and the creation of school-entry clinics; through birth control information.

¶ Families on public assistance and unemployment compensation could be given a radical increase in grants, up to the level labeled by the government as "modest but adequate," with before-and-after evaluation to measure the rate of disturbance among the children. Similar demonstrations and evaluations could be made of programs to reduce crowding in homes.

Such programs and dozens of others that could be readily imagined (ideas, unlike programs, are a dime a dozen) would have the considerable advantage of dealing with the present situation as it is, rather than trying to create a vast new mental health empire with limitless scope. The agencies that now have responsibility for disturbed children would be given support proportionate to the task they face. Scarce mental health professionals would be involved in planning, training, evaluation and consultation, relating their skills to large groups of children, rather than to one child at a time. Large numbers of them could turn from their impossible assignments in a thin Freudian line of combat troops to more productive staff roles in other kinds of agencies. This would have the additional advantage of bringing mental health people more into the mainstream of community agencies—not as self-proclaimed coordinating kingpins—but as collaborating equals contributing special skills. It should also have the advantage of focusing the efforts of the clinical segment of the field on the treatment of the most severely disturbed, those who require the most skilled care.

Finally, a broad agreement on policies—preferably the ones recommended above but, in any case, policies that deal with the urgent problems outlined—would make it more possible for all the interests involved, many of which have been surreptitiously pointing at one another as culprits, to link up in a united effort. Then we would be ready to spend the money we know is needed. Then, and only then, can we get an answer to the question: Who cares for emotionally disturbed children?

LETTERS *(continued from page 762)*

frontation" would look like. If he is advocating more radical forms of income distribution and wants the social workers to join him in such a program, let him say what he has in mind; let him suggest specifically what social services he would have us eliminate and what economic solutions he would have us advocate. Anything less is mere brave talk. . . .

There is no real choice between serving human beings in trouble and changing the system in which they live, and one does not prove one's commitment to one by openly despising the other. It was C. Wright Mills who pointed out to his sociologist colleagues that they must understand deeply the connections between public issues and private troubles, and that they must take responsibility for showing the interplay between the two. To this idea most social workers and sociologists are committed, and neither their interests nor those of the people are served when they turn their guns on each other. The enemy is in another direction.

William Schwartz
Associate Professor of Social Work
Columbia University

moderation for all

New York City

DEAR SIRS: W. B. Saunders says that Soviet ideology has changed from the "world-revolutionist" doctrine of the Stalinist days to "peaceful coexistence" [letter, June 6]. But Stalinist foreign policy was based—contrary to the Trotskyist doctrine of world revolution—on the principle of "socialism in one country." Mr. Saunders is right in attributing the policy of peaceful coexistence to the advent of the nuclear age—partly. But whether the rising affluence in the USSR contributed to the policy of moderation, is not as certain. The most affluent—and still, presently the most bellicose, least moderate—great power is the United States, as *Nation* readers know well. If we want to retreat from the "brink of nuclear disaster" we should also retreat from moral haughtiness, advocating the moderation of others while following the most immoderate way in foreign politics the world has ever known.

Robert Major

Madariaga fund

New York City

DEAR SIRS: In 1961, Salvador de Madariaga honored Spanish Refugee Aid by accepting, together with Pablo Casals, the honorary chairmanship of this organization. Now, for his 80th birthday, July 23, we have decided to establish a scholarship fund in his name for the benefit of the children of Spanish Republican exiles.

The candidates will be chosen from among the 10,000 Spanish refugee families in France who need assistance. In the past few years Spanish Refugee Aid has given help to an increasing number of gifted children in order to keep them in school. These small scholarships, ranging from $150 to $350, cover the cost of books, lunches, carfare and clothing.

Through the Salvador de Madariaga Fund we hope to raise $10,000 in order to give grants to many more students, including a few who are especially gifted and should go on to college. If there is a candidate for the College of Europe in Bruges, Belgium, where he is Honorary President, Madariaga has asked that $1,000 be given as a special fellowship.

We hope your readers will be in sympathy with our twofold purpose to help students of needy refugee families and thus to honor our chairman. We hope they will contribute. Checks (tax deductible) may be sent to Spanish Refugee Aid, 80 East 11th Street, New York, N. Y. 10003.

Hannah Arendt, Chairman

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BOOKS & THE ARTS

Two Sides to the Dienbienphu Story

VIET-NAM WITNESS: 1953-66. *By Bernard Fall. Frederick A. Praeger. 363 pp. $6.95.*

DIEN BIEN PHU. *(Third Edition, revised and enlarged.) By General Vo Nguyen Giap. Foreign Languages Publishing House (Hanoi). 254 pp. $1.75 paper.*

JONATHAN MIRSKY
A teacher of Chinese at the University of Pennsylvania, Mr. Mirsky visited Vietnam in 1965. He is one of the contributors to Peace in Vietnam: A New Approach in Southeast Asia *(Hill and Wang).*

When Robert Guillain, long-time traveler and writer in Asia, returned in 1953 from the French encampment at Dienbienphu he remarked to some colleagues: "The commander in chief has just explained everything to us dogmatically, and I, a humble journalist, would stake my life on it that he is either making a terrible mistake or lying to us. I would be ready to swear that the situation he has described has nothing in common with reality."

Is this where we came in? Do those of us who pay attention to history have to relive it along with everyone else? When we criticize the war in Vietnam a common question is: "Doesn't the President have experts who tell him the truth?" The answer which gives least comfort but may be true is that American administrations since Truman have thought we could *win* in Vietnam. LBJ probably doesn't care if it's a war of aggression or a civil war, if the "socio-economic revolution" takes place or not, if desertions from the ARVN number 10,000 or ten per month, if 80 or 8 per cent of the NLF come from the north —these "facts" used to be carried about in a thick black folder from debate to debate by serious young Foreign Service officers; they don't bother any more.

If one becomes friendly with White House staff members or State Department area specialists, such arguments do not arise. It is *winning* that preoccupies the Administration and *winning* that preys on the minds of the military in Vietnam. A friend who recently went on a high-level VIP mission to Vietnam told me of his shock when officers in Saigon heaped scorn on the socio-economic communiqué of Honolulu, and called instead for a million men to come over and finish the job. American pilots voice their frustration at being kept from the targets that really count in North Vietnam: Hanoi, Haiphong and the Red River Delta. But, draftees apart, there are still plenty who will go willingly to Vietnam, impelled by the indifference of the nation, fascination with death, love of killing and "professionalism."

The purposes of those who plan the war are simpler. They intend to prevent a Communist take-over and to construct a powerful logistical base for a future war with China. Past Vietnamese leaders like Diem and Quat showed signs of wanting to negotiate. If Ky would only be silent he would be ideal for his sole function: pressing the war itself.

Pressing the war, keeping up our guard in the Far East (the favorite line of the "reasonable" China experts) leads to certain results: large piles of dead Vietnamese and growing numbers of dead Americans. While it is true that more and more citizens are troubled by the dead bodies and the baffling demonstrations in Vietnamese streets, what is significant is that dead human beings and a troubled public do not visibly slow down the military effort. More troops arrive, planes fly, bombs drop. It might be embarrassing if a new Saigon government asked us to leave, but Henry Cabot Lodge has said we would stay anyway. What is irritating about the riots and

WHAT WERE THEY LIKE?
(Questions and Answers)

1) Did the people of Viet Nam
use lanterns of stone?
2) Did they hold ceremonies
to reverence the opening of buds?
3) Were they inclined to rippling laughter?
4) Did they use bone and ivory,
jade and silver, for ornament?
5) Had they an epic poem?
6) Did they distinguish between speech and singing?

1) Sir, their light hearts turned to stone.
It is not remembered whether in gardens
stone lanterns illumined pleasant ways.
2) Perhaps they gathered once to delight in blossom,
but after the children were killed
there were no more buds.
3) Sir, laughter is bitter to the burned mouth.
4) A dream ago, perhaps. Ornament is for joy.
All the bones were charred.
5) It is not remembered. Remember,
most were peasants; their life
was in rice and bamboo.
When peaceful clouds were reflected in the paddies
and the water-buffalo stepped surely along terraces,
maybe fathers told their sons old tales.
When bombs smashed the mirrors
there was time only to scream.
6) There is an echo yet, it is said,
of their speech which was like a song.
It is reported their singing resembled
the flight of moths in moonlight.
Who can say? It is silent now.

DENISE LEVERTOV

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the immolations is that they ruin the myth of a defenseless country asking for help—a myth, it must be repeated, which is not believed in Washington or in Saigon (where many Americans openly express their loathing for the Vietnamese). The myth is useful for dealing with awkward questions.

Bernard Fall has been inquiring into Vietnamese affairs and asking awkward questions for thirteen years. *Vietnam Witness: 1953-66* is a collection of some of his best essays. For many it will be more satisfying than the widely read *Vietnam Reader,* edited with Marcus Raskin, in which it somehow never emerged that the war after 1954 began in the southern zone. In this volume, an article from 1958 details the failure of the land-reform scheme and the "economic miracle" under Diem and Nhu, and includes, too, an early mention of the American Friends of Vietnam energetically trying to win friends for the Saigon regime. Fall said: "Much has been said, especially in American publications, about the improved administration of the country, and particular emphasis has been laid upon the fact that the present South Vietnamese administration has been the product of nationwide elections held in 1955. This overemphasis on formal processes rather than on political facts can, at least in part, be attributed to the application of an American scale of values to an alien situation." In 1958 not everyone was saying that.

American knowledge of Vietnam has benefited greatly from French scholarship and journalism: Lacouture, Devillers and Fall (although a long-term resident in America, Fall remains clearly French) are the most famous examples. Without Fall's substantial contributions most American debate would run out of material. Nor is Fall, after years of watching the battle, numb to the pain. In a piece titled "The Impersonal War," following a recitation of statistics showing the American capacity to blast anything that stirs, Fall concludes: "A prostrate South Vietnam, plowed under by bombers and artillery and still in the hands of a politically irrelevant regime, may become the victim of aroused social and political forces, for which aircraft carriers or eight-jet bombers cannot provide a ready answer in the long run."

Administration supporters and critics alike love to quote from Fall's pages. He is a political scientist, looking always for that which is impractical or stupid or "unworkable." Where his pieces appear may have some effect on what he says. Thus, in *The Saturday Evening Post* in 1962, following a trip to Hanoi, Fall refers to the huge American military commitment in the south which fares so badly against the guerrillas, "but provides a strong bargaining position. For it enables us to at least threaten direct retaliation against North Vietnam itself." Such hints appear more than once, and Fall has discussed the problem on TV as well. He was very careful not to advocate actual air strikes (and now deplores them) but he was conscious that Americans did not want to seem to "surrender," urging that the *threat* of American bombing would make Hanoi fear Chinese intervention.

This kind of reasoning explodes into napalm when read in certain quarters, as might his suggestion that "with Southeast Asia no longer under American control, India's position would become well-nigh impossible." That was in 1962. Surely this entangles separate issues. How much of Southeast Asia *was* under American control? If India's position is difficult, the problem would seem to lie elsewhere.

Political science is likely to lead to another sort of haziness. Fall, who has seen war since his days in the French Resistance, knows that "it does little good to judge a war from the comfort of a study." Yet in one sentence he states that many people on both sides "have only a dim perception of what it is all about," and in the next, "to them the whole war is a series of ground-level engagements fought for very personal motives: to obtain land, to chase away foreigners. Rightness and justice (or their absence) come up more often than Marxism-Leninism." Many of us may question whether or not such a "perception" is "dim." Nonetheless, those who want to see an acute and expert observer at work over a period of time will find this collection informative and long-viewed. Obviously, the escalation of the war is not because of a lack of information in Washington. Fall, who has been right longer than anyone, must wonder if the professionals on Vietnam have been reading anything but one another's memoranda.

Perhaps, like the French, our Administration scorns the enemy. The stab-in-the-back theory, recently revived by General Taylor, is more comforting for the public than facing the fact of a tough enemy. How can weedy little runts in black pajamas possibly keep coming year after year? In 1953 the French regarded Vo Nguyen Giap, the military commander of the Vietminh, as a noncommissioned officer and took care always to refer to him as "General"—in italics. Late in 1953, when almost no one could think of any reason for carrying on with the war, General Navarre decided to chew up the "Viets" by drawing them into a pitched battle in northwest Vietnam. On November 20 the first *paras* were dropped into the "chamber pot" of Dienbienphu valley. Although it was plain to early visitors to the enclave that the force was doomed from the outset, it was not until May 7 that the more than 16,000 soldiers were either dead or captured.

Dien Bien Phu is General Giap's account of the siege. This is the third edition (the first was 1959), enlarged, and with a good deal of hindsight inserted. Giap includes an informative background to the siege, giving an accurate description of French intentions as well as his own, and a series of Letters, Orders and Messages delivered to the troops.

It is always fascinating to hear two sides of a story. Jules Roy, for example, has written an emotional account of the French effort in *The Battle of Dien Bien Phu* (Harper & Row). Roy is furious at the stupid vainglory of the French politicians and generals, and admires the almost superhuman dedication of the Vietminh.

Giap provides an interesting insight: In April, 1954, the very month when America was considering dropping an A-bomb on the besieging army in order to save the French garrison, "a rightist and negative tendency appeared among our officers and men, under various forms: fear of casualties, losses, fatigue, difficulties, hardships, underestimation of the enemy, subjectivism and self-conceit . . . a serious and thorough ideological struggle took place . . . the great result obtained was the suppression of all manifestations of the erroneous tendency." It is, somehow, comforting, to know that the other fellow can shake in his sandals, but sad that such normal emotions should be described only in an ideological context.

One reason the French lost is that they supposed it impossible for the Vietminh to supply a large enough force to besiege Dienbienphu. Coolies simply couldn't carry enough pounds per man. But bicycles could. Specially reinforced they could be pushed bearing 500 pounds, more than ten times the best French estimate. Eighty thousand coolies! The supreme importance of these *dan cong* can be seen in Giap's frequent reference to their contributions, discipline and political education. In a special letter he commands those in charge of the supply units to "pay great attention to the *dan cong's* life." It took four months to manhandle the guns into position for the assault. French determination to win was exceeded only by ignorance of Vietminh capability.

The critical example of French un-

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AN AMERICAN PARABLE

Good boys are we to have retrieved
for its owner the ball
which first we dipped in liquid gold
with affection
Now he keeps pitching it farther and farther
curious excited and alarmed
nor can we understand
since it is returned to him
each time heavier with gold
and less wieldy

DAVID IGNATOW

derestimation centered on artillery. Colonel Piroth, whose responsibilities included the French batteries and appraising the enemy's, assured one and all that he could command the slopes surrounding the French positions, and that concealing his guns would not be necessary. When half of them were put out of action within three days, he blew himself up with a hand grenade.

How was it possible? French planes combed the sides of the hills searching for signs of Vietminh artillery. Giap describes how the 126 cannon were trundled by night over miles of jungle without leaving a trace. "Within the range of the enemy artillery, under the constant observation of scout planes, a gigantic building yard was functioning in the vicinity of Dien Bien Phu . . . our troops worked at night in the open country . . . and under the camouflage of lattice works many kilometers long. . . . In February, 1954, while our preparatory work was in full swing, the enemy, thinking that perhaps we had given up our plan to attack Dien Bien Phu, sent his bombers to other fronts."

Once again, however, we are reminded that the Vietminh were mortal. There are hints in Giap's book that there were those who would have ordered a quick victory. "However, these tactics had a very great impediment; despite their ideological and tactical preparation our troops lacked concrete experience in attacking fortified camps, because this was the first time and (it) . . . was a powerful one."

At the very moment that the Vietminh guns were being moved into position, Jules Roy recounts that René Pleven, Minister of the Armed Forces, visited Dienbienphu. He addressed Colonel Gaucher of the Foreign Legion:

> "Isn't it true, unfortunately, that we have to reckon with Viet artillery, since I gather they have some?"
> Gaucher: "M. Minister, we shall fight as at Verdun."

Flying back to Hanoi, M. Pleven confided that he hoped the Vietminh would not attack. (Machiavelli had written long ago: "The most important point is not to gather your army on a plain at the foot of a mountain which the enemy might be able to occupy unimpeded; for with his artillery he would crush you. . . .") Only General Fay, Chief of the Air Staff, seeing the impending disaster said: "I shall advise General Navarre to take advantage of the respite available to him . . . to evacuate all the men he can, for he is done for. That is all."

Dien Bien Phu contains numerous noteworthy points. There is, for example, a widespread view that Asians do not value human life and that Communists in particular regard their troops merely as so much cannon fodder. Giap constantly reminds his officers to make sure that their men have "hot food, hot drink, and sleep soundly in the warm." No American mother could ask for more—assuming that, like General Giap, she wants her son to be a healthy warrior.

Elsewhere, Giap praises Mao's *thought* as a significant contribution to a people's war, but the vital Chinese *material* aid, which Navarre foolishly failed to anticipate, is nowhere mentioned, not even in this most recent edition.

Without question Dienbienphu was a decisive battle. Yet not only there but throughout the French war, reality seemed absent. On November 20, 1953, according to Roy, Rear Admiral Cabanier called on General Navarre, and presented him with the views of the President of the Republic: the time had come to open negotiations with the Vietminh.

However, at that very moment three battalions of paratroops were being air lifted to Dienbienphu. Two surprises:

Michael Goldman, Poetry Editor, will be on leave until September 15. During that time no poetry will be considered for publication, but we will welcome submissions again in the early fall.



This is a picture of Edwin Lawrence Godkin.

His forte was cocking a critical eye at American democracy. He spoke to the educated American of his generation, to whom he was, as William James wrote, "certainly the towering influence in all thought concerning public affairs." He became the first editor of *The Nation* in 1865 and editor in chief of *The New York Post* in 1883. He was a liberal. Today he still speaks clearly to the educated American in this rich and lively collection of his political and economic essays, most of which appeared in *The Nation*. He was against Radical Reconstruction, the spoils system, the protective tariff, American imperialism. He was concerned about civil service reform, fear of labor unrest, the moral and political decay in modern democracy. He appealed to his audience's desire for a politics of ideology and purpose, a politics of trained and educated intelligence. As one re-reads these pieces, one is not surprised that he should have established, as the editor points out, an enduring tradition of sustained, ironic criticism of American public institutions.

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Paris heard of a highly risky maneuver for the first time, and the man in charge learned that he could expect no serious support.

But these are details of no great importance, because nobody in Washington has any more respect for the French than Navarre did for Giap. Of what use is Giap's description—of Fall's thirteen years of devoted reporting and predicting? Some day, we may imagine, there will be a judgment.

The journalist, James Cameron, traveling through Thanh Hoa province in North Vietnam encountered an elderly lady who had lost an arm following an American air raid. She said: "I suppose there is a reason for all this, but I do not understand what it is. I think I am too old now ever to find out."

Cowboy of the Western World

THE LBJ BRIGADE. *By William Wilson. Apocalypse Corp. 124 pp. $4. Pyramid Books. 141 pp. 60c paper.*

JOEL LIEBER

Mr. Lieber is a free-lance journalist whose first novel, How The Fishes Live, *will be published by McKay this year.*

The cover of this slim little novel, *The LBJ Brigade,* gives nothing away. Published in hard cover in January and now in paperback, it has received almost no notice, no reviews and no advertisements. A request to the publishers for information about the author elicited nothing more than what appears on the book jacket: "A young American soldier's shocking story of warfare in Vietnam." Perhaps the publishers are trying to play it safe, hoping to sell to both anti- and pro-policy readers. But once read, it reveals itself as very strong stuff indeed, the strongest that has yet appeared in fiction about this war. It cannot but help to remind the reader of the emotional jolt experienced on first reading Dalton Trumbo's *Johnny Got His Gun.*

Told in the first person, it is a story of a nameless recruit, apparently a recent college graduate, who is sent to Vietnam to halt communism. His soldiering makes of him one of the "cowboys of the world . . . trying not to scream or pray." The book recounts a patrol mission, an ambush, a slaughter and the narrator's wanderings through villages and jungle with his sergeant, who becomes the narrator's "survival kit," a man who is not an expert on war but an expert on staying alive. Sergeant Sace's credo runs thus:

> Ya ain't gonna have no trouble knowin who ta shoot. If he ain't white, shoot em. This's a race-war kid. A hundred-year-old hag can kill ya just as dead as a hot Charlie. So can a ten-year-old kid. If he ain't white, screw the questions, shoot. . . . If he ain't white, un if he ain't six feet tall, shoot em. If ya don't, ya've had it.

The soldier's loss of innocence is here, as is his first horrified reaction to being under fire. What makes it worse for this soldier is that he tries to justify the mayhem in terms of stopping communism ("I have killed Communists, now they cannot hurt America"), and winds up with a blank: "I am a thief of life." If he finds Sace cold-blooded, he does not know what to think of the air force after they carry out a gas attack on a village in which he is hiding: "What are they, is there a devil who gives them the power to kill without making them feel like killers?"

Wilson can be didactic, but rarely overwhelmingly so. The prose is refined and neat, squeezed craftily for power and shock, as in the ambush scene: "Ames disintegrates like a glass house, he rains back into the weeds."

If he tends to deal in stereotypes, he manages, nonetheless, to make the individual character altogether believable in his hands. This is true of the blonde-toting general staggering into a car that "guns away with an American hum of power," of the photographer snapping a bar that's just been blown apart and commenting, "Got some pretty good stuff," of the doctrinaire Communist officer, and of the book's intellectual voice, Handson, who says of Lyndon Johnson that he wants to go down in history as "the American Christ." Within the 141 pages of his story, the author conveys a variety of information: the comparative cost of white and Asian whores, a napalm attack, a convincing bit of exposition contrasting a dead Vietnamese girl soldier with the girls back home necking with their boy friends at the drive-in. Though these might easily ring false, the handling is adroit and such scenes ring sickeningly true.

The narrator never commits himself to a particular position. He only suggests. It is no accident that he has no name. He is every soldier whose nightmare experience finally convulses him beyond the rationality with which he has been conditioned. "Take me back," he howls. "I'll be good. I won't complain. I'll do whatever I'm told. I won't cause trouble. I'll be a good American. . . . I'll pay my taxes and go to church and vote the right way, I won't cause anybody any trouble. . . . The President can save me. . . ."

If it is argued that polemics have no place in novels, it must also be obvious that this war is causing more and more writers to become polemicists in their art. The trouble with polemics though is that the nature of the form forces agreement or disagreement. If in this case a reader agrees, whole scenes will stay with him long after finishing the book. And if, by chance, the book's impartial cover will cause it to be read by supporters of the military solution, it's the kind of book which might very well change a few minds.

Left Tradition

THE LEFT IN EUROPE SINCE 1789. *By David Caute. McGraw-Hill. 256 pp. $2.45 paper.*

JEFFRY J. KAPLOW

Assistant professor of history at Columbia University, Mr. Kaplow specializes in the history of modern France. He has written Elbeuf During the Revolutionary Period *(Johns Hopkins Press) and* New Perspectives on the French Revolution *(John Wiley).*

On the first day of graduate study, my master said to me: "You may define concepts as you will, provided they are both clear and useful in explaining the past." On the second day of graduate study, my master said to me: "Avoid anachronism. Do not expect a boy to be a man, nor Babeuf to be Marx." On the twelfth day of graduate study, my master said to me: "Go and sin no more." But one sinner saved is soon replaced by another.

There is some question in my mind as to whether one ought to attempt a single definition of the European Left since 1789, as Caute does. The problems of society, and therefore the grounds of political identification, have changed so rapidly in the last 175 years that what was "Left" in 1789 was often "Right" by 1793; what was revolutionary in 1848 was conservative in 1871. In the presence of so intense a rhythm of change, what purpose is served by the establishment of a lowest common denominator of the Left?

I would not be misunderstood. There is a Left tradition in Europe, and it is a strong one. Robespierre was a hero to the French Socialist historians of the 1920s and 1930s, just as Babeuf now enjoys the esteem of contemporary radi-

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cals. The English Left honors the Chartists, and the Soviets think highly of the Decembrists. And that is as it should be, despite the fact that Robespierre and the Decembrists, some of the Chartists and certain Babeuvistes would no doubt be horrified by the point of view of the present-day Left. It is not the specific programs that matter but rather an attitude of mind. The present honors the past for having had the courage to seek answers to one fundamental question: what shall we do to stop the exploitation of man by man? The essence of the tradition and that which unites the past to the present and, hopefully, to the future is the vision, as Vanzetti expressed it, of a world "where man will not be wolf to the man." The rest is commentary.

But Caute is not content to note the tradition. He must have a more concrete string with which to tie the Left up into a nice little bundle. The search for that string keeps his eyes riveted firmly to the ground from the very beginning of the book. The so-called characteristics of the Left are examined in turn and rejected as false or inadequate in what seems to me to be a masterpiece of faulty method and confusion.

First of all, what Left is he talking about? Nowhere does Caute make clear his criteria of selection. Is there some standard, or even arbitrary, definition to work from—or is he examining all the groups that have identified with the Left at one time or another? If the former is the case, he should tell us what that definition is; if the latter, he should learn to use a historical machete, for it is simply ludicrous to throw the First International and Gambetta together for any purpose whatever, analytical or otherwise.

Second, Caute ought to know that a list of attributes may delimit but does not generally define its subject. He is at great pains to compile such a list in order to destroy each of the items on it. It is wrong, he argues, to attribute to the Left a monopoly of rationalism and intelligence, but he confuses rationalism with reason and intelligence with art. He is unhappy about identifying the Left with faith in the perfectibility of man, but he makes that hope dependent on belief in historical determinism, where the two are logically and practically separable. He rejects anti-racism as a characteristic of the Left because some leftists are racists, but he neglects to ask whether such racism is programmatic. Similarly, he manages to lump anticlericalism with anti-religion, and then to argue the invalidity of both as definitions of the Left, because religious people vote for, or even join, left-wing parties. As for liberty and equality, he neatly dodges the issue by refusing to accord the words any specific content. It is true that some people believe the essence of liberty to be unrestricted private enterprise, but that does not seem to me to make love of liberty meaningless as a characteristic of the Left.

After all this, Caute informs us that "most political situations, medieval and modern, reveal groups to the left of other groups, but the Left itself, viewed historically and conceptually, is an absolute based on a minimum demand of one man, one vote." This is his minimum definition of popular sovereignty which, he assures us, is identified with universal suffrage, if not always with democracy. At this point, it is I who am confused, both theoretically and as to the fact situation. What is popular sovereignty? If it means one man, one vote, then many men on the Left have been willing to do without it for extended periods of time, precisely in order to insure a greater measure of democracy than might otherwise have come into being. Moreover, if it means universal suffrage, then it is a matter of pure form, without reference to the social antagonisms of a given time and place. It hardly allows for the dynamic definition of the Left across time to which Caute aspires, nor does it give us any but the most summary of analytical tools. This little piggy believes in universal suffrage, this little piggy is on the Left. . . . Caute is aware of the problem and tries to resolve it by extending the frontiers of popular sovereignty in the direction of social democracy. But if this be the case, why not declare at the outset that the Left has always been identified with the desire to readjust property relations and leave the intellectual somersaults alone?

There is much of value in this book, both for students and the general reader. Caute efficiently dispels a whole series of bourgeois myths about the destructive nature of revolution and the meaning of terror and dictatorship. His factual accounts are generally reliable. Unfortunately, a good part of the book is vitiated by an anti-Communist and anti-Soviet bias that sometimes goes beyond reasonable limits. It is, I think, correct to criticize the tactics of German Communists in 1932, but it is not permissible to burden them with the responsibility of Hitler's rise to power, as Caute does at least by implication. In regard to the Soviet Union, popular sovereignty becomes a whip with which to beat Stalin and his successors. An examination of Stalinist and, indeed, Soviet shortcomings in the exercise of power is welcome, but the attempt to read the USSR out of the ranks of the Left because "the original quest for popular sovereignty" has become obscured is properly ridiculous. First of all, that quest goes on and, second, there is more to being on the Left than popular sovereignty can encompass.

A number of more minor faults may be pointed out. I would suggest that the sans-culotte defense of their traditional economy was not quite so blind as Caute believes, but was based on a reasoned and reasonable set of moral options. The illustrations are well chosen, but the captions sometimes fall short of the mark. Why repeat the cliché about the revolu-

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By Laura Tallian

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tion devouring its own? And is it true that Lenin contradicted Marx in maintaining that "revolution is not evolution"? Worst of all is the commentary on Georges Grosz's *The Millionaire*: "Left-wing millionaires are not unknown." *Tiens!*

Caute ends his book without drawing conclusions. Are we to assume that the Left is dead or reduced to the role of gadfly in the consensus? If so, it requires a eulogy. If, on the other hand, it is still alive, then it is proper to ask: where does it go from here? To end abruptly, as the author does, is to leave half his job as a historian undone.

The Siege and the Commune

THE FALL OF PARIS: The Siege and the Commune, 1870-1871. *By Alistair Horne. St Martin's Press. 458 pp. $6.95.*

GABRIEL JACKSON
Mr. Jackson, author of The Spanish Republic and the Civil War *(Princeton University Press) teaches history and humanities at the University of California, La Jolla.*

In mid-July of 1870 the French Emperor, Napoleon III, declared war on Prussia. The French army was immediately outclassed by the leadership, discipline, speed and overall tactics of the Prussians. After six weeks of fighting, Napoleon surrendered with his besieged army at Sedan on September 2. The Emperor was officially repudiated, and France was declared a republic on September 4. These events, far from ending either the war or the political crisis, led to a more intensive period of both military and political struggles, in the course of which Paris underwent two sieges.

The fast-moving Prussian army completed the investment of the capital on September 19. The population showed a tremendous will to resist, but it proved impossible to achieve unified leadership. Partisans of the republic were divided between bourgeois conservatives, anxious to avoid a social revolution, and Jacobins looking to the egalitarian traditions of 1793 and 1848. Generals were jealous of one another, and lacked confidence in their troops. Units of the regular army and of the National Guard looked upon each other with mutual contempt. The one massive effort to break the siege ring in late November ended in complete failure. Inexorably, through the month of December, the city approached starvation. But the Prussians became nervous at the prolonged siege. It seemed always possible that reorganized French units might cut their own thinly held supply lines in the direction of Germany. They therefore decided to hasten the end of the siege by shelling the city, and so for two weeks in January, 1871, Paris was subjected to indiscriminate bombardment by the newly invented Krupp heavy artillery. On January 18, King William I of Prussia became Emperor of Germany at the coronation ceremony in the palace of Versailles. On January 28, the provisional government of Adolphe Thiers signed an armistice, and the siege of the humiliated capital was lifted.

During the following month Bismarck forced humiliating peace terms on the Thiers government, including a triumphal Prussian entry and three-day occupation of Paris. In the wake of the Prussian withdrawal the provisional government was unable to establish its authority in the resentful and long-suffering capital. The city declared itself a self-governing Commune. Once again Paris was to withstand a siege, this time by units of the French army under the authority of the provisional government at Versailles. And once again the city was to offer proud and bitter resistance, but without unified leadership. To the prosperous middle class the Commune meant municipal self-government within a federal republic. To the heirs of the Jacobins it meant social reform and anticlericalism. To Socialists and anarchists it meant an active political role for the new urban proletariat. What began in March as a skirmish between municipal and central authority became a social and class war fought much more bitterly than the Franco-Prussian War of the months preceding. During the climactic week of the second siege, from May 21 to May 28, the conquering French army executed about 20,000 communards and presumed communards while self-styled Commune police murdered about seventy-five hostages, one of whom was the Archbishop of Paris.

The Fall of Paris describes the two sieges in rich and fascinating detail. The author's interest in his subject stemmed from a larger concern with Franco-German relations in the past century, and specifically with three decisive military encounters between the two nations: at Sedan in 1870, Verdun in 1916 and Sedan again in 1940. But in studying the war of 1870, he found first that the Prussian siege of Paris seemed more significant than the Emperor's surrender at Sedan, and then that the civil war and the Commune of 1871 overshadowed in importance the Prussian siege. His book concentrates on the life of the military and civilian populace of Paris. There is copious detail concerning the bewilderment of the soldiers in the absence of effective military leadership, the demoralization of the populace by the enforced isolation of Paris during the Prussian siege, the importance of rumors, the terrible suffering caused by slow starvation and the spectacular but relatively ineffective nature of Prussian shelling during the first half of January. The chapters on the Commune describe in detail the personal and political conflicts among the mayors of the twenty *arrondissements,* the police prefects, the National Guard officers and the revolutionary vigilance committees.

The emphasis on personalities and on daily living conditions forms a worthwhile corrective to the many writings which have viewed the Commune solely as an incident in 19th-century class warfare. Also, it is an unhappy fact that too many historians, preoccupied with the grand outlines of their narrative, fail to convey a sense of what it felt like for human beings to live through the events which they summarize. Mr. Horne's book is strong on detail, social context and atmosphere. On the other hand it would, I think, be very difficult for an uninitiated reader to follow the main lines of political development through the hectic months from the outbreak of the war in July, 1870, to the crushing of the Commune in May, 1871. It would also be difficult for him to understand why Frenchmen fought so ferocious a civil war after the struggle with Prussia had ended.

Mr. Horne's interest arose from his wider concern with Franco-German relations. But the most dramatic and complex incidents in his history can be explained only in terms of the memories of 1793 and 1848; the industrialization and urbanization of France during the Second Empire; the fierce pride of Paris as the initiator of all significant political and cultural trends in France; the misunderstandings between the Bordeaux, and later Versailles assemblies and the representatives of Paris; the royalist conservatism of the French countryside in collision with the republicanism of Paris, etc. All these factors are mentioned at one time or another, but their meaning is not integrated with the course of daily events as narrated in *The Fall of Paris.*

It seems to me also that Mr. Horne falls into a kind of error which is very frequent in works which are designed to emphasize "human interest." We have all grown up on the folklore of Paris as a "naughty" city. Mr. Horne writes as if the prostitutes and pickpockets of Paris, the

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orgies among its decadent fringe, etc., were somehow more evil, more widespread, and more insidiously corrupting than similar phenomena in other great cities. We all know that Spaniards are supposed to be hot-tempered, and so we smile knowingly when we read that the Empress Eugenie "flew into a terrible, Spanish rage." Historians ought to pass a self-denying ordinance not to attribute to mythical national temperaments the all too human characteristics of their protagonists.

The Injustice Drinkers

PARADISE ON EARTH: Some Thoughts on European Images of Non-European Man. *By Henri Baudet. Translated by Elizabeth Wentholt. Yale University Press. 87 pp. $4.50.*

EDWARD T. GARGAN
Mr. Gargan is professor of history at Wesleyan University. His latest book is De Tocqueville *(Hillary House).*

When Ibn Khaldûn completed in 1377 his *Muqaddimah,* an introduction to the history of the world, he suggested that the task of understanding a different culture was made the more difficult by a taste "for the beauties of the poetry of his own people." Yet he thought that the Qur'ân offered hope: "In the creation of the heavens and the difference of your tongues and colors, there are indeed signs for those who know." Men have in all times and cultures made some effort to understand those not of their own civilization. Professor Henri Baudet of the University of Groningen has surveyed the changing Western images of non-European communities to add to our knowledge of the elusive "complexities" of the European personality; he convincingly demonstrates that as the Europeans met and described the peoples of Asia, Africa, Australia, North and South America, they fashioned at the same time the iconography of their own souls.

In his wise, delightfully written, perfectly structured, interpretative essay, Baudet proposes that European confidence and insecurity, righteousness and sinfulness, generosity and meanness of spirit have determined Europe's ability to relate to the world beyond Europe. Myths about others have paradoxically both supported and ignored the power conflicts between Europe and the rest of the world. The persistent view of the Negro as nature's child and slave directly served power and greed, while the tenaciously held belief in the American Indian as a noble savage defied cruel practice. Non-European settings freed the European imagination to express the most ambitious expectations of joy, sex, comfort, luxury, bliss, harmony, hope, ecstasy, liberty and salvation. And in their less happy moments Europeans asked others to dance out Europe's lust for violence, servitude, hostility, vulgarity, sexual deviation, disorder and decadence.

With little or no real information about the world beyond Europe, fables and tales were elaborately developed which often had as their true purpose confirmation of the ancient legends of a Golden Age. The hope was never abandoned that the virtues and pleasures of that vanished time were somewhere preserved in distant and exotic parts of the globe. When considerable knowledge was acquired about China, for example, this intelligence was quickly transformed into the stuff of dreams and fantasies. Such dreams did have their pragmatic function. In praising the civilization, the grace and the humanity of China, the savants of Europe could expiate their own guilt for the barbarity and superstitions of Christian Europe. Criticisms disguised in the idealized reports of the Orient encouraged projects for the improvement of the human situation in Europe. By the 18th century psychology and geography brought together by commerce created an imaginary world indispensable to the psychic life of Western man.

Henri Baudet offers the interesting idea that during the Enlightenment rational reflection on the everlasting quest to find Paradise on earth made possible the more limited though optimistic goal of writing universal history. Modern comparative history began when Montesquieu in his *Lettres Persanes* rejected the culture of Europe as the norm for mankind. His criticisms drew on the memory of earlier, more natural, human societies and on the model provided by a "not yet" corrupt non-Western peoples. The images of an ideal past age and of an innocent people outside of Europe "fused into a single universal image of human existence throughout the length and breadth of the earth." "World history," Baudet suggests, "was born at that moment and, since it is based on a philosophical rather than an historical principle, it is still the philosophers rather than the historians who write it."

In the 19th century, imperialism and the

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more scientific study of primitive and non-Western societies restrained the full play of the European imagination toward the wide world. Baudet concludes his study by examining this harsher and more prosaic interaction between Europe and the non-European universe. He brilliantly calls attention to Renan's retelling of *The Tempest* to illustrate Europe's corruption of so much of the world that it touched. As presented by Renan, discussion between Ariel and Caliban clearly signaled Europe's intention to destroy Caliban's manhood. Renan's genius enabled him to predict Caliban's unending question to Europe, "Why did not Prospero see that the Aryan tongue which he taught me I would use as a means by which to curse him?"

Baudet's account of the European encounter with the world makes possible whole new approaches to some of Europe's most prestigious philosophers of history. Baudet does not consider Hegel. But a comparison of Hegel's *Philosophy of History* and the European dreams concerning the non-European world proves instructive. Hegel's imagination, in contrast to the fertile myths that preceded his work, was atrociously narrow, and Hegel's philosophy, so significant for Europe's search for meaning in history, denied and spoiled every European image of Paradise on earth. He presented the "sensual Negro," as having a perfect contempt for humanity, and as a creature slavery prepared to be human. Out of the many entrancing accounts of the Chinese, Hegel selected those reports which presented them as cruel and dishonest, a people incapable of "the exalted, the ideal and the beautiful." He judged the Hindus as afflicted by a "monstrous, unnatural imagination." And Comte, like Hegel, thought that the Western Europeans, the "elite peoples," were alone serious subjects for the study of society. It was Kant who recognized that Europe was preparing to close its mind and heart to the qualities of those it intended to dominate. He believed China to be a "wonderful state," and he dreaded what would happen to Asia when the West had broken its resistance to European civilization. Kant described European commercial expansion as conducted by Europeans who "drink injustice like water," and he thought China and Japan were wise to refuse entry to the European powers.

That entry was gained, however, and since that time Europe's search for Paradise has been replaced by less lovely and increasingly more satanic views of the world beyond Europe. Europe and its Atlantic neighbors may never be able to create again the noble and happy image of man destined for Paradise on earth. Hell and the belief in devils provides its own stimulus to the imagination and to ideologies. But the peoples so moved are less human than those who pursued the illusion of Eden. Oswald Spengler appreciated this reality when he predicted that in this century, "The great cosmopolitan foci of power will dispose at their pleasure of smaller states—their territory, their economy and their men alike. . . ." Such is the condition of those who willingly find themselves outside the gates of Paradise. They have no lost innocence to regain, but they strangely fear that the gates of Hell will prevail against them.

Peaks And A Valley

RENAISSANCE AND REVOLUTION: The Remaking of European Thought. *By Joseph Anthony Mazzeo. Pantheon Books. 349 pp. $6.95.*

ARTHUR HEISERMAN

Mr. Heiserman teaches Medieval and Renaissance literature at the University of Chicago. He has published short stories in Harpers, Mademoiselle *and the* Kenyon Review *and is the author of* Skelton and Satire *(University of Chicago Press).*

Professor Mazzeo's brave excursion through "the intellectual backgrounds of the literature of the Renaissance" illustrates the fascination with the Renaissance begun in the Renaissance itself. The Renaissance (Professor Mazzeo mentions the period between 1300 and 1660) was invented by its own men to express that feeling, shared by other lively generations, that they were "remaking European thought," or at least restoring its learning and art. To define their relationship with their cultural traditions, they persuaded themselves—and us—that European history consisted of two peaks separated by a dank valley 1,000 years long. This shaping of history into three normative eras also answered the old questions: Why are our times so despicable and what's to be done about our sick culture? Easy: It—the Decline, the Disaster—happened during a *media tempestas* (the term was apparently invented in 1469), and we must make a modernity that revives an ancient purity.

The standard historian's propositions (like "men felt . . ." "humanists agreed . . .") which enliven Mazzeo's pages invite a brief excursion among our own emotional commonplaces. They could warrant one's saying: We poor neo-neo-moderns—even our villain, Victorianism, turns out to be a profound exotic. We have no antiquity, no Eastern, African or American innocence left to emulate. Our own times seem so despicable, our belief in restorations so weak, that every era but our own seems distantly Arcadian. Even the faddish melancholy that enriched many eras of "The Renaissance" can seem childishly sweet as we regard the apocalypses that await, we are sure, our lousy world. If, as Mazzeo says but does not attempt to demonstrate, the Renaissance ended with the rise of the Idea of Progress, our own "category of the future" hardly bears thinking about. Our pasts do, if only to feed a desire to find out where it all went wrong. Our Renaissance past continues to fascinate because it saw such a brilliant success in age labeling that its students can become devotees of a Good. On the other hand, it is itself such a nice candidate for the role of villainous *media tempestas* that devotees interested in shaping our history-drama into easy roles often become strident apologists for its virtues.

If you believe, with Mazzeo, that history first happens in the minds of men, and if you judge that the ideas of the Renaissance are Good, such generative authors as Machiavelli, Castiglioni, Bacon and Hobbes tend to become godlings creating a quasi-scriptural corpus demanding laudatory exegesis. Like Burckhardt's, the St. Augustine of this exegetical tradition, like that of most popular historians, Mazzeo's is the rhetoric of praise. He does not evaluate the modern world (no one can demand that he should), but is content to laud the famous realism of Machiavelli, the seminal methodologies of Descartes and Bacon, even—though one feels a reluctance here—what he takes to be the sentimental idealism of Castiglioni. Still, the category of the future hovers around many of his pages. Petrarch, e.g., is praised insofar as he had unknowingly emerged part way from the cocoon of Christianity. One feels on some pages that the destruction of Christianity—which had, I'm here told, denied man's freedom and condemned all but the elect to piety and hell—might yet be a fruit of the Renaissance. (It may be significant that Mazzeo mentions Calvin twice and Luther not at all.) All these legendary figures are, of course, dramatically appealing (though Mazzeo does not spend much time on biographical data), and it is predictable that the romantic historian and dramatist, fox-faced Machiavelli, gnawing his entrails in exile, should play a leading role, as though his bitter little perversion of the genre devoted to the education of a Prince were a grand treatise on political theory. It is

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also predictable that an "age" of tyranny and scientism like our own should take a curious possession of "the perfidious Machiavel," bribe-taking Bacon and scandalous Hobbes, and that its rhetoric of praise should partly rest on corrective apologetics. As Mazzeo generously acknowledges again and again in his text and notes, most of what he says is derived from this tradition of apologetic exegesis, and is therefore predictable to the scholar. It is "primarily for the layman" that he makes this modern but well-worn tour of those semi-sacred monuments which mark the sources of our age.

I hope I have not implied that Mazzeo has constructed a plot from his mythic material. While his admirable preface hints that his treatment, which is chronological, might show the rise and fall of themes, with the final emergence of the Idea of Progress, he does not force his writers or texts to play roles in a story he invents. Each author is treated almost entirely in isolation from the others. His discussion of Bacon, for example, does not contain a reference to Machiavelli. Such a method might lend itself to precise, unadulterated scrutiny of each thinker on his own ground, but the tourist here seldom feels the ground beneath his feet. (The discussion of Hobbes is 14 pages gone before the word *Leviathan* appears.) Because so much of what he sees and hears derives from secondary material, and so little from the words of the author or the events of the times, the lay reader feels at a great distance from the ideas he is supposed to be scrutinizing. His view is further dimmed by the drifting progress of the tour. Too often one seems to wander from topic to topic with small sense of the procedure of either text or guide; one feels that many paragraphs of the Machiavelli chapter, for example, could be shifted to one or another page without affecting the chapter's obscure argument.

Yet the value of this book derives precisely from the vast amount of secondary material brought, in notes and text, before the lay reader. The notes themselves provide a guidebook to a great many recent discussions of one or another aspect of the Renaissance, modern science, etc. Mazzeo approaches his enormous task honestly, bravely and lovingly; but the task may have been doomed from the start.

And that for a curious reason which makes the book itself seem an illustration of a couple of points made on its most illuminating pages. Renaissance humanism began, he notes, by producing a curriculum shared by most European schoolboys; its end saw that separation of "the sciences" from "the humanities" from which we suffer today. These observations point at one of the thorniest barriers faced by a scholar (Mazzeo has published distinguished scholarly books) who tries to write "primarily for laymen." Unlike their English counterparts, whose addresses to laymen enjoy greater success, American academics cannot be confident of the learning they share with their lay readers. The specialized English humanist works almost exclusively with undergraduates, sharing a more or less common curriculum, and he can continue to talk to them in print. The American humanist must throw his science against the barrier unarmed with assumptions about a common learning, and his book is likely to come through bled white.

ARCHITECTURE / ERVIN GALANTAY

Mr. Galantay is an associate professor in architecture at Columbia University and practices as a consultant in urban design.

The growing complexity of modern society and the swelling population are gradually changing the professional role of the architect. This is too little recognized by the public and often ignored by architects as well. Some architects still seek fulfillment in the creation of pristine monuments, while some clients prefer to think of the architect as a jack-of-all-trades who can be conveniently blamed for cracked ceilings and dripping faucets. Yet an awareness is dawning that the primary social function of the architect is not to provide abstract beauty or "nuts 'n' bolts" wisdom, but rather to improve our physical environment through the creation of a meaningful visual order.

Significantly, the more creative minds in the profession are turning from preoccupation with single buildings to building groups and to a concern for the overall form of the city and the region. Formalists will argue that the same challenge can be found in the design of a soup plate or toilet bowl as in the design of a hospital or a new town. Yet to me it is self-evident that there is a hierarchy of design tasks, ordered both by the complexity of function and the number of people ultimately affected. Hence the greatest challenges to modern architects are in the design of multi-functional complexes, urban renewal and new communities.

Campus design ranks among the most exciting of the tasks, since the university also forms a micropolis and can become a laboratory of urban design theories. If the design of an urban campus is enmeshed with problems of the social and physical fabric of the city, the design of an exurban campus may amount to the creation of a new town. In an army every fighting man is supported by a train of noncombatants: similarly, a professor on the payroll represents ten people for the planner, who must account for dependents and the supporting cast in retail trade and services. Thus a new campus with 20,000 students will generate a community of more than 90,000 people: no trifle when we recall that the great cities of our culture needed centuries to reach a comparable population.

Some campuses are built within a few years, but they tend to expand indefinitely: hence time becomes a design factor as form and order must be provided in the context of growth. Since future development may not be controlled by the initial designers, means are sought to insure continuity. This is best done by establishing systems of order and of visual coherence rather than by enforcing conformity in detail. The problems are rela-

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tively new to architectural practice and one looks for novel solutions. Luckily, it is not necessary to travel to Europe or Japan—a glance across our northern border will suffice. Canadian architects have recently built two campuses which make the much publicized efforts in this country appear superficial and formalistic by comparison. The Scarborough campus of the University of Toronto provides a truly urban solution by its contiguous arrangement of all functions. The resulting concentration and high density eliminates the use of the automobile within the complex; intra-campus movement is adequately served by "pedestrian streets." The design integrates laboratories, classrooms, offices and social areas in a single group form without sacrificing their functional identity. Simon Fraser University in Vancouver, B.C., provides, by contrast, a spinal organization along which the growth of component elements can occur in a variety of shapes and sizes without loss of organizational clarity and visual coherence. The introduction of a vast covered forum onto this campus is an honest recognition of local climatic requirements that breaks free of the usual borrowing from Mediterranean stereotypes.

In the United States one looks in vain for such boldness. In my last column I discussed the billion-dollar expansion program of the State University of New York and two of its newly created centers: architect Edward Stone's Albany campus and the Stony Brook center on Long Island. In Albany one is served with clichés of single-building design proportionally enlarged, while building groups are multiplied with the ease and logic of rubber stamping. I described the Albany campus in some detail and promised to pay the same attention to Stony Brook, but a second visit to the site convinced me that such treatment would be quite pointless: the buildings completed so far have no architectural merit whatever.

It must be said that the State University Construction Fund is not fully to blame for the present Long Island campus, since it was originally designed for a smaller student body under the auspices of the State Department of Public Works. The 640-acre site was donated by shoe-fortune heir Ward Melville, and the campus shields the donor's adjacent "Stony Brook Village" from the threat of visual encroachment by lower-class subdivisions. In a similar spirit of tact, the architects of the campus tried to match the pseudo-colonial (or is it neo-federal?) grace of "Stony Brook Village" by affecting a colonial mood, adding sentimental trappings to barrack-like buildings: white columns, slate roofs, marble trim. If this was also meant to sweeten a primly authoritarian layout characterized by axial asphaltways, it did not deceive the students; they promptly nicknamed the style of their environment "neo-penal," an expression that was picked up by both *Look* and *Newsweek* magazines, winning for Stony Brook unexpected national publicity.

The State's reaction to needling has been quick and ambidextrous: a crash program of ivy planting around all buildings was initiated, and some key design assignments were quietly transferred into abler hands. Soon the first architecturally significant buildings will rise and adjust the visual impact of the campus. Architect Kessler's sculptural lecture hall and Damaz, Pokorny & Weigel's dignified Student Union will establish new standards of design. A task force has been formed to salvage whatever is useful in the master plan, and to redirect some of its objectives under the cloak of a "Design Manual" which is the State Construction Fund's instrument to enforce overall order and visual continuity. Since some elements of the original master plan have already ossified, further design has to be corrective and compromises will be unavoidable. Amending meaningless axes and trying to improve on the regimentation of relations between buildings, the new planners may be tempted to overcompensate by romanticizing "spot design" —the juxtaposition of picturesque little spaces. This, in combination with buildings of varying and competing design, might lead to visual confusion of the World Fair variety. The real opportunity for a novel design approach at Stony Brook now exists in the future medical center, which will be located on still virgin land separated from the present campus by a highway. There the planners will be able to display fresh ideas unencumbered by leftover concepts.

The Albany and Stony Brook campuses are exasperating because so much effort and money have been spent to produce so little meaningful design. Admittedly, the new centers had to be stamped out of the ground in a short time. Perhaps this left too little time for basic thinking. There may have been too many restrictions; at times, one senses the influence of a "janitorial viewpoint" on the design. It is possible that considerations of efficiency and maintenance have been given priority over functional linkages and a humane environment. One learns, for example, that the number of students in dormitory groups is determined by the optimal operating efficiency of the dining halls—i.e., the pleasure and convenience of the concessionaire.

Some other stuffy planning concepts have also been swallowed whole; for instance, the separation of the student community from other age and social groups. The campus becomes a ghetto neatly walled in by a ring road, parking and buffer zones. It may be adequate as a hive for learning and perhaps mating; but not a single shop is permitted on campus, let alone a bar, discothèque, cinema or motel. The same two-dimensional mentality triumphs in the unquestioned segregation of undergraduates, graduates, married students and faculty. Yet great universities thrive on a cheerfully overlapping relation of town and gown, students and masters.

The entire concept of the exurban campus should be rethought. The monastic ideal of seclusion in the ivory tower is hardly appropriate for a state university, and at the same time the rise of the modern "University City" has unsavory roots: In Europe, as in Latin America, governments removed the universities to the urban fringes or out of town from fear that politically active student bodies might foster anarchy and lead riots in the center. By contrast, in a modern democracy the university should be in the city to ferment civic consciousness, provide leadership in community affairs, and benefit from interaction with the dynamic forces within the city. The location of universities in urban renewal areas could provide the healthy core needed to make such efforts successful. Here is a case where planning goals and budgets of various state and federal agencies could be coordinated for maximal impact. The symbiosis of the city and the university may at times generate tension, but it will also yield higher intensity; both the city and the university lose by separation.

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